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Since the founding of the United States our maritime
industry has been supported by protectionist government
policies. These sometime ill-supported policies were
further broadened in 1920 in a long range commitment to
foster an efficient privately owned U. S. merchant marine
adequate to meet our national defense and commercial needs.
Subsequent government actions have built on this commitment.
One in 1946 committed the government to the long term
development of an efficient U. S. shipbuilding industry, as
2
a supplement to the merchant marine. In practice these
policies have taken the form of restricting segments of U. S
waterborne commerce to the U. S. flag merchant marine,
restricting U. S. registry to those vessels constructed in
domestic shipyards, and various direct and indirect subsidy
supports to both the merchant marine and shipbuilding
industries. On the surface the results of these policies
Merchant Marine Act, 1920 , 41 Stat. 988, ch 250 (1920)
2Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 , 60 Stat. 41 (1946).

have been markedly unsuccessful. In the period 1954 to 1969
the U. S. flag share of our foreign commerce decreased from
27.5 to 4.8 per cent. The U. S. merchant marine has failed
to renew its fleet at the rate of other maritime powers and
as of June 30, 1970 more than two-thirds of the active fleet
was 25 years old. Our private shipbuilding industry cannot
compete with price offered by foreign shipyards and except
for government support (merchant and naval shipbuilding
programs) could not exist at all.
A major problem of any government maritime support
program is that the "maritime industry" is a myth and does
not exist. It is an amalgam of diverse shipping, labor, and
shipbuilding interests which have few common interests
especially when it comes to agreeing upon how limited
government support funds should be spent. Programs which
assist subsidized fleet operators can hurt unsubsidized
operators and may not provide adequate construction work for
shipyards. Programs to build more costly automated (labor-
saving) ships provide shipyard employment but reduce funds
available for operating assistance to marginal fleet owners
U. S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration,
Annual Report FY 1970 (Washington, D. C: Government Printing
Office, 1971), pp. 1 and 27.
.

who cannot afford the new ships . Ship conversion programs
may assist marginal operators and repair yards but be
opposed by large fleet owners and major shipbuilding yards.
No less vehement in each case will be the divergent labor
voices of longshoremen, seagoing, and shipyard unions.
No where is the dichotomy of interest more diverse
than between the ship operators and shipbuilders which are
linked in a system of government support. The problem of
this coupled support is best stated by Samuel A. Lawrence
in a study directed towards factors affecting the shipping
industry:
. . . the public policy considerations applicable
to subsidizing ship operations are in many respects
quite different from those applicable to subsidizing
the yards. Furthermore, the present system, which
gears shipyard aid to the operating industry's need
for new equipment, provides no assurance that American
Shipbuilding is maintained at the scale required to
meet mobilization needs. Continued coupling of the
two programs appears instead to represent a political
marriage of convenience, which contains serious
disadvantages for both partners.
Statement of the Research Question
Research Question: How effective have government subsidies
been in carrying out government policy toward sustaining a
Samuel A. Lawrence, United States Merchant Shipping
Policies and Politics (Washington, D. C. : Brookings Institute
1966) , p. 5.

commercial merchant shipbuilding capability in the United
States and what are the prospects for the future?
Subsidiary Questions:
1. What is the U. S. commercial merchant shipbuilding
industry?
2. What is government policy toward the commercial
merchant shipbuilding industry in the United States?
3. What are the government subsidy programs which
effect the U. S. commercial merchant shipbuilding industry?
What is their cost?
4. What is the relative magnitude of the subsidized
shipbuilding programs in relation to other shipbuilding and
repair work in U. S. commercial merchant shipyards?
5. Have the subsidy programs encouraged commercial
shipping companies to invest in new construction ships from
U. S. commercial shipyards?
6. Have the subsidy programs stabilized construction
workload in the U. S. commercial merchant shipbuilding
industry?
7. Have the subsidy programs encouraged the U. S.
commercial merchant shipbuilding industry to improve its
competitive position?

8. What are the expectations that the new Merchant
Marine Act of 1970 will develop and sustain a viable commercial
merchant shipbuilding industry in the United States?
Purpose and Utility of the Study
It is the writer's purpose to critically examine the
effectiveness of the various subsidy programs towards develop-
ing and maintaining an efficient merchant shipbuilding industry
in the United States. The subject is particularly timely
because under the revised subsidy programs of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1970 the nation is embarking on a ten year,
300 ship construction program designed to revitalize the
merchant marine as well as the shipbuilding industry. The
Maritime Administrator, Andrew E. Gibson, has stated that
the new program will require during the 1970 decade an invest-
ment by the shipping lines of $4 billion for new ships, $500
million by major private shipyards in modern facilities, and
labor management relations in both industries which settle
disputes without work stoppages. The first two aspects of
the program are within the scope of this research, the latter
is not. The study of the recent past forms the basis for
estimating the potential of improving the competitive position
Shipbuilders Council of America, Shipyard Weekly No.
48 (November 25, 1970).

of the shipbuilding industry and reaching the goals set for
the new program.
In accomplishing the purpose it is necessary to define
the subsidy programs their costs and their effects. Since
the merchant marine subsidies effect only part of the ship-
building industry and even there only provide a fraction of
the employment, the shipbuilding industry must be analyzed
to place the subsidy program in its proper context to the
total ship construction effort in the United States.
Because merchant ship construction in U. S. shipyards
is tied to the ship replacement programs of U. S. ship owners
it is necessary to consider not only subsidies directly
concerning ship construction and replacement, but also the
full range of ship operating subsidies and aids. These not
only have different effects on the various elements of the
merchant marine, but it is probable that some may alter the
economics of ship operations sufficiently to discourage the
replacement of old ships.
Scope and Limitations
It is intended to limit the area of investigation to
the privately owned U. S. flag ocean-going merchant marine
and the major private shipyards which construct and accomplish

major conversions for it. Unfortunately an investigation of
this nature is constrained by data limitations and inconsis-
tencies in classification of shipping services, shipyard
employment, and ship types. Understanding this the scope
and limitations are as follows.
Time Period 1954-1971
The period of study selected is 1954 to 1971. The
year 1954 marked the start of the replacement program for
our war built merchant fleet and an in depth review of our
merchant marine policies. Except for the influx of foreign
ship orders during the 1956 Suez crisis and the break out of
government ships from the National Defense Reserve Fleet
(NDRF) during that time and later in 1965 to support military
shipments to Southeast Asia, the period has been relatively
devoid of artificial economic factors.
Merchant Marine
Consideration of the merchant marine is limited to
privately owned U. S. flag ocean-going ships engaged in
oceanborne commerce. Included are U. S. flag vessels in
foreign trade, and U. S. coastwise, intercoastal (east/west
coast), and noncontiguous (Alaska, Hawaii, etc.) trade.
Excluded are ships operating exclusively on the Great Lakes

8and inland waterways, special type ships such as cable ships,
fishing vessels, and all government owned ships.
The focus is on dry and liquid cargo shipping. The
demise of U. S. passenger shipping which occurred during the
1954-1971 period is not addressed, but because some U. S.
lines operated both passenger and cargo ships the former have
had an effect on government subsidy distribution and corporate
financial conditions. Also passenger liners are sometimes
included in statistics under the heading "Combination
Passenger and Cargo".
Although not part of this study, it should be recognized
that the U. S. government owned merchant fleet consisting of
the small Military Sealift Command (MSC) nucleus fleet and the
larger mothballed, World War II built National Defense Reserve
Fleet (NDRF) , have had basically a three-fold effect on
private industry. First the NDRF has been a depressant on
the demand for new merchant ship construction since it has
been a reserve upon which the nation could draw to meet
national defense shipping needs. This effect has been of
decreasing importance during the 1954-1971 period and whereas
the fleet consisted of 2,067 ships at the end of Fiscal Year
1954, it had dwindled to 1,027 ships at the end of Fiscal Year
1970; of the latter virtually all were close to 25 years old
\

and only 3 50 were considered suitable for reactivation.
Secondly, as will be discussed in Chapter III/ it has been
the source of trade-out ships for unsubsidized operators
under the Ship Exchange Program. Thirdly the NDRF has been
used to augment the fleets of private operators during times
of crisis. For example during the 1957-1959 period the
following number of government ships were made available to
private operators under bareboat charter to ameliorate
shipping shortages caused by accelerated exports of commercial
2




Again during the Vietnam War government ships were broken out
of the NDRF to carry military cargo to Southeast Asia. This
time the ships were operated by U. S. shipping companies under
General Agency Agreements with the Maritime Administration.
The number of ships active on the first day of each fiscal
3
year were:
MARAD, Annual Report FY 1970
, pp. 15 and 71.
2MARAD, Annual Report FY 1957




.Estimated from General Agency Agreement data contained
in MARAD, Annual Reports FY 1964-1970 .
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1965 2 1969 144
1966 10 1970 109
1967 120 1971 2
1968 144
There is another fleet, not included, which should be
recognized because of its commercial and national defense
significance. This fleet consists of those non-U. S. flag
vessels considered to be "under effective United States
control" and referred to as the EUSC fleet. EUSC is a
military concept and includes non-U. S. flag shipping which
can be made available to the U. S. Government under request
in time of national emergency. The fleet consists of those
vessels registered in Panama, Honduras, or Liberia, which
have been built overseas by U. S. citizens or have been
transferred from U. S. registry. It came into being because
of the lower construction costs in foreign shipyards; the
lower operating costs, primarily due to lower foreign wage
rates; and tax advantages granted by the country of registry
The effective control principle is administered by the Mari-
time Administration under one or a combination of four types
1
of agreements with the owners;
U. S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration,
Effective United States Control of Merchant Ships - A Statis -
tical Analysis 1970 (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing
Office, 1970), pp. 4-8. v
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1. Contracts at the time of transfer from U. S. flag.
2. U. S. ownership or U. S. parent company control.
3. War risk insurance provided by the U. S.
4. Letters of commitment.
The EUSC fleet operates in both U. S. foreign trade
and foreign to foreign trade. Although smaller in number of
ships, its carrying capacity is equal to that of the privately
owned U. S. flag merchant marine. Its 1968 composition is
summarized in Table 1. In that year the EUSC fleet carried
15 per cent of U. S. foreign trade as compared to only 6.4
per cent carried by U. S. flag ships. Its major effect is in
the tanker trade where the larger, faster, and more modern
EUSC ships carried 26.8 per cent of U. S. tanker cargoes.
The U. S. fleet carried only 5.4 per cent. Bulk carriers
are the second most important segment of the EUSC fleet. In
1968 174 EUSC bulk carriers participated in U. S. foreign
1,2
trade as compared to only 4 U. S. flag bulk carriers.
In some measure this fleet represents an indirect cost
or benefit forfeited by the U. S. subsidy policy which did
not provide support to the U. S. flag bulk and tanker fleets.
Ibid
. , pp. 25-27.
2James R. Barker and Robert Brandwem, The United
States Merchant Marine in National Perspective
,
(Lexington,













Tanker 268 11,846 13 44
Bulka 87 3,164 15 36
Freighter 45 395 25 9
Total 400 15,405 - -
Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Maritime
Administration, Effective United States
Control of Merchant Ships - A Statistical
Analysis 1970 (Washington, D. C. : Government
Printing Office, 1970), pp. 26-73.
a
Includes dry bulk, ore/oil and ore ships.
Includes dry cargo freighters, combination
passenger/cargo, and reefer ships.
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The lack of subsidy support to match the economic benefits
of foreign ownership have driven these ships from the U. S.
merchant marine, whereas our subsidized liner fleet is
significantly superior to the World War II built EUSC
freighters. Also since it is another form of a defense
reserve, the EUSC fleet has been a further depressant on
the national defense need for a larger ship construction
program.
National Defense
There are both commercial and national defense aspects
to the Federal maritime policy. In this thesis national
defense requirements are considered only as they have
effected the merchant marine and ultimately the U. S. ship-
building industry. The national defense needs for merchant
shipping and military auxiliaries in times of national
emergency are not addressed. Nor is the important question
as to what is the optimum composition of the fleet from a
defense standpoint.
Major Private Shipbuilding Industry
The segment of the shipbuilding industry of interest
in this research comprises the major private shipyards with
a capacity to build large ocean going ships. The work of
interest within these shipyards are the merchant ship con-
struction programs. Using this definition the major private

14
shipyards are those with a capability to build ships 475 feet
long x 68 feet beam and over, as this is the C3 type ship
size, the minimum size ship built in the Maritime Administra-
tion postwar subsidized fleet replacement program. Excluding
the Great Lakes shipyards, there are at present 17 shipyards
with this capacity in the country.
The major private shipyards and the level of merchant
ship construction within these yards is only a fraction of
the U. S. shipbuilding and repair industry and before going
further it is well to place their importance in proper
perspective. In March 1970 of the 140,000 employees in the
private shipbuilding and repair industry (an additional
85,000 were employed in naval shipyards) 79,000 or 56 per cent
were employed in the major shipyards. Of the 61,000 direct
(production) employees involved in shipwork in the major
shipyards 13,000 were engaged in merchant ship construction,
232,000 in naval construction, and 16,000 on repairs. Table
2 is a compilation of Census reports on the value of ship-
building and repairing performed in the entire industry,
identified by the 1967 Census of Manufacturers as comprising
U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Status of Shipyards, Hearings , before the Seapower Subcommittee
Statement of Andrew E. Gibson, Maritime Administrator. 91st
Cong., 2d sess., 1971, pp. 10656-10657.
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389 companies, which own 415 establishments only 253 of
which employ 20 or more employees. The value of self-
propelled non-military new construction has never exceeded
30 per cent (1958) of the total shipbuilding and repairing
effort, and for each year since 1962 has amounted to 20 per
cent or less. Although this figure is not directly com-
parable to the merchant construction of the major private
shipyards alone, they do make up most of the total.
Subsidy Defined
A difficult problem in any discussion of this subject
is the lack of a common definition of the term "subsidy" and
the lack of standard usage in the Federal Government. The
term is not defined in the Federal budget document. The only
Federal statutes using the word "subsidy" and the only places
where it appears in the Budget are those dealing with mer-
chant ship construction and operation. In fact the word has
a negative connotation which has caused a proliferation of
euphemisms in practice. The Joint Economic Committee notes
that proponents of a program avoid and resent the term
"subsidy". They prefer to characterize their programs as
U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Domestic
Commerce, United States Industrial Outlook 1971 with
Projections through 1980 (Washington, D. C. : Government




"aids" or "expenditures in the national interest", while
opponents label a program a "subsidy" in an attempt to
suggest that it will benefit a few to the detriment of the
common good. After reviewing a variety of definitions and
analyses of the term the committee in 1960 decided on the
following definition, which is also the definition to be
used in this thesis:
A subsidy is an act by a governmental unit involving
either (1) a payment, (2) a remission of charges, or
(3) supplying commodities or services at less than cost
or market price, with the intent of achieving a particu-
lar economic objective .... Government loans made at
lower than market rates of interest or at rates below
the cost of funds to the Government and Government
insurance provided at lower than private insurance
premium rates may also appropriately be considered as
subsidies
.
This definition distinguishes subsidies from . . .
aids to business . . . where the Government does not
determine the program which it wishes to see fulfilled
. . . . Purchases or sales made on the Government's
own behalf which may prove more profitable to the
private seller or buyer than comparable transactions
on the open market, except where a primary motive of
such transactions is assistance to a particular seg-
ment of the economy.
. . . Classed as a subsidy is differential tax
treatment for particular categories of persons or
groups ....
U. S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subsidy and
Subsidy-Effect Programs of the U. S. Government , Joint Committee
Print, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D. C. : Government





Research has been conducted through the use of
written materials on the subject. The primary sources of
most all data are published Maritime Administration statistics
Sometimes these data have not been taken directly from Mari-
time Administration documents but have been obtained from
other researchers or industry groups who have compiled the
data into more useable formats or who have had special access
to unpublished data. In accomplishing the analyses of the
effects of subsidies on ship replacement and the shipbuilding
industry the author has deliberately tried not to use Mari-
time Administration analyses as a basis for research findings.
This was done to better maintain an independent view of past
and proposed subsidy policies.
Organization of the Study
Chapter II develops the background legislative acts
leading to the enactment of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936.
It explores the concepts of this basic statement of U. S.
maritime policy, analyzes its effectiveness and describes
its major modifications up to and including the Merchant
Marine Act of 1970.
With the foregoing policy discussion as a foundation




programs and their costs. Highlighted are those that involve
the largest expenditures and all those that have an effect on
ship construction and conversion in U. S. shipyards.
Chapter IV evaluates the effects of the subsidy
program as administered by the Maritime Administration on
ship replacement by the U. S. merchant marine. Special
emphasis is placed upon the replacement problems of the
foreign trade dry cargo fleet as it comprises the largest
segment of the merchant marine and has been most directly
effected by the subsidy programs.
Chapter V defines the major private shipbuilding
industry, its employment, and condition. The effects of
the subsidized construction program are analyzed both as an
industry and an individual shipyard basis. The effects of
one alternate program developed in Chapter IV are presented.
The prospects for the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 reaching
its shipbuilding goals are discussed.
Chapter VI summarizes Chapters I through V and draws
conclusions as to the past effectiveness of government sub-
sidies toward sustaining a commercial merchant shipbuilding
capability and the prospects for the future.
The Appendix contains a glossary of terms.

II. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MARITIME POLICY
Historical Background
The U. S. maritime industry has been under almost
continuous study and review since the founding of the nation.
Current maritime programs are therefore the result of a long
period of trial and error policy evolution in an attempt to
solve the basic problem:
How to develop and maintain a Merchant Marine and
shipbuilding industry, adequate to serve the commercial
and defense needs of the nation, even though American
ship operators and shipbuilders cannot generally
compete in international markets without government
assistance.
Samuel Lawrence divides the post-revolutionary history
2
of the U. S. maritime industry into three stages. During
the first phase which ended with the Civil War the maritime
industry generally prospered under a protectionist shipping
policy. The first tariff act, enacted by the First Congress
in 1789, allowed customs duty and tonnage tax deductions in
Arthur D. Little, Inc., Ship Construction Differential
Subsidies (Boston: Arthur D. Little, Inc., 1961), p. 22.
2




favor of U. S. shipping. Another legislative act of 1789
provided that only ships built in the U. S. and owned by
U. S. citizens could register under the American flag. The
Navigation Act of 1817 reserved the U. S. coastwise trade to
U. S. built vessels and in 1845 the ship operators received
their first direct government payments in the form of mail
contracts.
The Civil War was a turning point for the U. S. mer-
chant marine. Many ships dropped U. S. registry to avoid
Confederate raiders and the subsequent conversion from wood
to steel and sail to steam left the U. S. industry at a
competitive disadvantage. The maritime industry was let
wither as government and public interest turned inward to
the profit potential of westward expansion. The U. S.
maritime industry was never again to regain in peacetime
its pre-Civil War vitality.
The third stage, the revival of the U. S. maritime
industry, began in the 1890 's with the recognition that the
merchant marine was inadequate for commercial or defense
needs of the nation. No effective action was taken however
until the Shipping Act, 1916. U. S. foreign commerce depended
Joint Economic Committee, Subsidy and Subsidy-Effect




so much upon foreign shipping that when, in 1914, belligerent
nations withdrew their ships from U. S. trade it was necessary
to pass legislation to supplement the merchant marine by the
expedient of allowing U. S. citizens to register foreign
built vessels under U. S. laws. The Shipping Act, 1916
subsequently created a Shipping Board for the purpose of:
. . . encouraging, developing, and creating a naval
auxiliary and naval reserve and a merchant marine to
meet the requirements of the commerce of the United
States with its Territories and possessions and with
foreign countries; . . .
The Shipping Board was authorized to charter, construct, lease,
and purchase vessels for use as naval auxiliaries. (It also
was authorized to regulate merchant marine shipping rates
and practices) . Actual ship construction developed slowly
and almost all of the $3.3 billion of merchant shipping
constructed was completed after the end of the war. This
left the Board with 13.5 million gross tons of major ships
(1000 tons or over); five times the U. S. pre-war tonnage.
It was the world's largest merchant fleet and over half of
Little, Ship Construction Subsidies , p. 25.
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it was owned by the Government which had no prior experience
m commercial ship operations.
The Merchant Marine Act, 1920 was largely concerned
with the transfer of the war built fleet to private interests.
The lasting significance of the Act is however that for the
first time it included a statement of long range maritime
policy objectives:
That it is necessary for the national defense and for
the proper growth of its foreign and domestic commerce
that the United States have a merchant marine of the
best equipped and most suitable types of vessels
sufficient to carry the greater portion of its commerce
and to serve as a naval or military auxiliary in time
of war or national emergency, ultimately to be owned
and operated privately by citizens of the United States;
and it is hereby declared to be the policy of the United
States to do whatever may be necessary to develop and
encourage the maintenance of such a merchant marine . . /
The Act also offered some incentives to private operators to
increase the size of their fleets by construction in U. S.
shipyards including a construction loan fund of $125 million
for five years and tax exemption on excess profits reserved
for new construction. A companion measure, the Ship Mortgage
Act, 1920, established a government mortgage program which
3
would finance up to 2/3 of the construction costs of a ship.
Lawrence, U. S. Shipping Policies , p. 40.








Because of the worldwide shipping depression which
began in 1920, immediately following passage of the Act and
the surplus of war built ships, its incentives did not
stimulate investment in new ships. From 1922 to 1928 no new
vessels were constructed in U. S. shipyards for the U. S.
flag foreign trade fleet and it was apparent that some form
of direct government assistance was necessary. The Merchant
Marine Act, 1928 is important because in reaffirming the
policy statement of the 1920 law it for the first time
provided substantial peacetime government assistance to the
merchant marine. This assistance was in the form of a mail
subsidy to offset higher U. S. operating costs. It marked
the beginning of the concept of long term contracts for
service on government determined essential trade routes in
return for government subsidy. As incentives to modernize
the U. S. merchant fleet and provide employment for U. S.
shipyards the Act increased the construction loan fund to
$250 million, provided preferential loan interest rates on
ships built for foreign trade, expanded the construction
fund to include reconstruction and reconditioning, and raised
the maximum government financing to 75 per cent of construction
costs
.
Ibid ., p. 27
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The Act of 1928 was generally unsuccessful because of
abusive practices in its administration. Mail contracts
were awarded without competition and at the maximum rates
allowed by law. In 1933-34 a special committee of the
Senate headed by Senator Hugo Black was extremely critical
of government administration and exploitation by the private
shipping interests. Concerning the construction program the
special committee found. that only 20 of the 43 mail contracts
required new ships and these 20 contracts specified a total
construction of only 51 ships. The committee concluded that,
"... no real consideration seems to have been given to the
self-evident proposition that a Merchant Marine must renew
itself continuously if it is to remain a factor in national
2defense and international trade."
The special committee recommended the end of govern-
ment subsidies and called for government ownership of the
merchant marine in its stead. It did, however, also recommend
direct ship operation and construction subsidies should Congress
elect to retain private ownership of the merchant marine. Con-
gress followed the latter course and with few exceptions the
Lawrence, U. S. Shipping Policies , p. 44.
2




special committee recommendation for a direct subsidy program
formed the basis of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936.
Merchant Marine Act, 1936
The clearest statement of the intent of this act is
in its opening statement. It has been changed little through
the intervening years. As originally written it stated:
It is necessary for the national defense and
development of its foreign and domestic commerce that
the United States shall have a merchant marine (a)
sufficient to carry its domestic water-borne commerce
and a substantial portion of the water-borne export and
import foreign commerce of the United States and to
provide shipping service on all routes essential for
maintaining the flow of such domestic and foreign
water-borne commerce at all times, (b) capable of
serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of
war or national emergency, (c) owned and operated under
the United States flag by citizens of the United States
insofar as may be practicable, and (d) composed of the
best-equipped, safest, and most suitable types of
vessels, constructed in the United States and manned
with a trained and efficient citizen personnel. It is
hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to
foster the development and encourage the maintenance of
such a merchant marine
.
Title II of the Act established a United States Mari-
time Commission to carry out its provisions. This has been
amended by executive reorganization plans in 1949, 1950, and
1961 so that there is now a Federal Maritime Commission and
a Maritime Administration (MARAD) . The Federal Maritime
Merchant Marine Act, 1936, 49 Stat. 1985 (1936).
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Commission functions are regulatory in nature and include
regulation and control of shipping rates, services, and
practices in both foreign and domestic water commerce. The
Maritime Administration as a part of the Department of
Commerce has the following major responsibilities (As will
be noted later the Merchant Marine Act, 1970 has made some
additions to this list.):
1. Survey the American merchant marine to determine
what additions and replacements are required to create a
privately owned merchant fleet for essential foreign commerce
which is adaptable to national defense requirements and con-
sists of vessels designed to operate safely.
2. Determine the trade routes essential to maintain
and develop U. S. foreign commerce.
3. Conduct continuing studies of the type, size,
speed and other requirements of vessels for service in foreign
commerce.
4. Conduct continuing studies of the relative cost
of constructing and operating ships under foreign registry
as compared to U. S. registry.
5. Determine on a continuing basis the extent of aid
by foreign governments to their merchant marines.
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6. Investigate, determine and keep current records
of the number, location and efficiency of U. S. shipyards.
7. Determine new designs of vessels, methods of con-
struction and means to promote the carrying of foreign trade
in U. S. vessels.
8. Cooperate with owners and shipbuilders to secure
trade preference for U. S. vessels and to construct the most
modern and efficient types of vessels.
9. Recommend to Congress legislation as necessary to
carry out the intent of the Act.
10. Conduct studies and report to Congress on the
removal of obsolete merchant tonnage, status of U. S. tramp
shipping service and comparative costs of constructing and
reconditioning ships in the several coastal districts of the
United States.
11. Acquire vessels constructed in the U. S. and suit-
able for conversion into naval auxiliaries by purchase or
otherwise as deemed necessary to establish, maintain, or
improve any essential service route or line in foreign
commerce.
The principle types of aid given the U. S. maritime
industries by the Act were;




1.. Payment of operating-differential subsidies to
qualified operators who provide regular and adequate service
on one or more essential trade routes. Tramp ships, all
tankers, and ships engaged in domestic trades were precluded
from eligibility.
2. Direct and indirect construction aids including
construction-differential subsidies, ship mortgage loans,
tax deferments on construction reserve funds, and trade-in
provisions of old ships for new.
The cost and effect of these subsidies are studied in detail
in later chapters. The authority to award, amend, and ter-
minate operating-differential subsidy and construction-
differential subsidy contracts is actually exercised by a
three man Maritime Subsidy Board headed by the Maritime
Administrator
.
The Merchant Marine Act, 1936 included three concepts;
1.. The central principle is the concept of cost
parity. Operating and construction subsidies are paid to
U. S. flag operators in order to equalize the costs of U. S.
operators with those of foreign competitors. The payments
are "direct" subsidies in that Federal Budget and appropria-
tions legislation identify them by the term "subsidy" and
1MARAD, Annual Report FY 1970
, p. 5 5
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they are paid direct to the maritime industry for the
purpose intended. It was a deliberate intention of Congress
to avoid the possibilities for abuses inherent in the
indirect system of mail subsidies of the 1928 Act and to
assure funds were utilized for the purpose they were
appropriated. The principle of parity through direct sub-
sidies has been modified however by a considerable number of
non-parity provisions such as indirect construction aids and
cargo preference. The net effect when combined with cabotage
laws is to alter the parity concept and to increase the
indeterminacy of the total cost of maritime subsidies.
2. Secondly the Act was primarily a liner act
deliberately designed to provide long term government support
to scheduled cargo liner service on essential foreign trade
routes, to the exclusion of U. S. flag foreign trade tramps,
dry bulk, and tankers. (Domestic trades also were not sup-
ported but they were already restricted to U. S. flag ships).
In 1936 a U. S. flag non-liner fleet was practically non-
existent, and none was considered necessary. In a 1937
report, "Economic Survey of the American Merchant Marine" ,
the Maritime Commission noting that heavy subsidies would
be required for a U. S. tramp fleet to compete concluded,
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"There is no demand for the American Government to subsidize
tramp shipping, and there is really no good reason why it
should attempt to do so."
3. The third principle of the Act, and a continuing
one since the Civil War, is that the U. S. shipbuilding
industry is tied to the U. S. merchant marine and through it
to government support. Vessels registered in the U. S. must
be built in U. S. shipyards and U. S. registry is in turn a
requirement for the receipt of government subsidy and for
operation in domestic trade. Because it does not compete
for construction of foreign ships the size of the U. S.
shipbuilding industry is determined to a substantial degree
by the size, age and prosperity of the U. S. flag fleet,
which in turn is determined by the subsidies it receives
from and the restrictions placed upon it by the Federal
Government.
The initial effect of the Act was the start in 1937
of a 50 ship per year, 10 year merchant construction program,
and by December, 1941, 150 ships had been completed or were
under construction in U. S. shipyards. The provisions of
Committee of American Steamship Lines, Progress of
the U. S. Liner Fleet under the Merchant Marine Act, 1936





the Act were suspended during World War II in which time
(1942-1945) U. S. private shipyards delivered 4915 steel
self-propelled merchant vessels totalling 3 7 million gross
tons. Following the war the Government was again concerned
with the transfer of war built ships both to U. S. citizens
and to help rebuild foreign merchant fleets. Under the
Merchant Ships Sales Act of 1946, 843 merchant ships were
sold between 1946 and 1951 to U. S. citizens for U. S. flag
operations at one fourth to one-fifth their replacement cost
2
and additional ships were sold to foreign interests. The
Act did one other thing, it recognized as a matter of policy
the specific need for an efficient U. S. shipbuilding industry
by including in its policy statement that the U. S. merchant
marine was to be "supplemented by efficient American-owned
3facilities for shipbuilding and ship repair, . . .". (This
wording has subsequently been incorporated into the Merchant
Marine Act, 1936 by the Merchant Marine Act of 1970.) No
action was taken however to develop a specific program towards
private shipyards or to promote stable shipyard employment
Little, Ship Construction Subsidies , pp. 40 and 60-
61.
2Joint Economic Committee, Subsidy and Subsidy-Effect
Programs (1965), p. 53.




until 1951 when as a national defense measure the Government
contracted directly with private shipyards for the construc-
tion of 35, 20 knot Mariner Class dry cargo vessels. They
were eventually sold to private ship operators or converted
to naval auxiliaries.
In 1954, the recognition that a program had to be
developed for replacement of the U. S. flag war built fleet
resulted in a full review of maritime subsidy policy by the
Maritime Administration. The major conclusions and recommenda-
tions in the review report were:
1. The parity concept is sound.
2. It is essential for development of the merchant
marine that the maximum amount of private capital be made
available.
3. Congress should authorize the sale of government
held ship mortgages and establish a construction revolving
fund to replace the uncertain annual appropriation of
construction funds.
4. A construction program of 60 ships per year is
sufficient to maintain a shipyard mobilization base of 36,000
shipyard production workers.
5. U. S. flag tramp shipping requires economic aid to
survive.
Little, Ship Construction Subsidies , p. 45
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6. Because the indeterrninacies involved in the
calculation of the construction differential subsidy (CDS)
complicate the subsidy negotiations, CDS should be deter-
mined for major types of ships rather than for individual
ships
.
The result was the inauguration of the largest ship
construction program in our peacetime history. The program
included constructing tankers under trade-in and Navy
charter programs, the repair and modernization of 200 ships
in the National Defense Reserve Fleet, and development of
replacement plans for the subsidized U. S. flag foreign trade
fleet. The construction programs were aided by the following
legislation, amending the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, which
although not incorporating all the recommendations of 1954
report did provide additional government assistance to the
maritime industry:
1. 1954 - Congress enacted a permanent cargo preference
statute (P.L. 83-664) reserving 50 per cent of government
cargoes to U. S. flag ships, primarily to the benefit of
U. S. flag tramp operators.
MARAD, Annual Report FY 1954
, p. 1.
2 Ibid




2. 1954 - A continuation of legislation enacted in 1952
reducing the minimum age of ships traded-in for credit towards
new construction from 17 years to 12 years thereby making most
of World War II construction available for immediate
replacement.
3. 1956 - Government mortgage insurance aid was author-
ized (P.L. 83-781) to supplement the direct government
mortgages provided by the 1936 Act. This gave impetus to
private financing and freed ship mortgages from dependency
2
upon annual Federal appropriations
.
4. 1960 - A Ship Exchange Program (P.L. 86-575) was
enacted, primarily to the benefit of non-subsidized operators,
authorizing the exchange of privately owned U. S. war built
ships for more modern or efficient war built ships owned by
3
the U. S. Government.
In 1957 the Maritime Administration claimed in its
fiscal year 1956 annual report that they had "achieved a plan-
ned shipbuilding program adequate to meet the country's
4immediate and future requirements." At that time there were
Little, Ship Construction Subsidies
, p. 52.
2MARAD, Annual Report FY 1955
, p. 2.
3MARAD, Annual Report FY 1970
, p. 14.





68 ships on order, or under construction, conversion, or
reconditioning. New operating differential subsidy contracts
had been negotiated with subsidized operators to replace
(dependent upon the availability of construction subsidy
funds from Congress) 82 ships in the period 1957-1970 and
negotiations were in progress for 105 additional ships in
the same period. In later years they were not so optimistic
and in the fiscal year 1958 and 1959 reports only claimed to
have made "progress to achieve" an adequate shipbuilding
program.
As the years passed the need for change in U. S.
maritime policy became increasingly apparent. Several
studies and Congressional hearings were conducted in the
period 1964 to 1967, but the real impetus for change was the
condition of the maritime industry itself.
1. Between 1958 and 1967 the U. S. flag share of our
foreign trade was reduced from 12.2 per cent to 5.3 per cent
and the actual tonnage carried was reduced by 1/3. It was
estimated that by 1980, if no new ships were constructed,
the U. S. foreign trade fleet would be reduced to 200 ships,
2
capable of handling 3 per cent of U. S. foreign trade.
Ibid
. , pp. 1-3
.
2MARAD, Annual Report FY 1970
, pp. 1 and 27.
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2. The subsidized liner replacement program was
failing to meet its goals because of limitations on government
construction funds and the financial inability of some opera-
tors to meet their replacement obligations. The latter was
effected by the risks associated with their ability to attract
additional cargo in the future and earn a satisfactory rate of
return on the large capital expenditures required. In 1964
the total program was for 295 ships by 1975. This was
estimated to require an operators investment of $1,946 million,
with 216 ships requiring $1,248 million to be contracted by
1967. Through fiscal year 1967 however only 155 ships and
$0,891 million of operators funds had been committed to
contract.
3. The unsubsidized foreign trade dry cargo fleet
continued to deteriorate. Provisions of the Long Range
Shipping Act of 1952 which permitted the use of construction
subsidy aid to bulk carriers was not utilized, in spite of a
large number of applications (30 pending at the end of FY 1967;
14 for subsidized operators and 16 for unsubsidized operators)
for such aid, "... pending a policy determination on subsidy
CASL, U. S. Liner Fleet , p. 18.




aid for vessels other than replacement ships for subsidized
operators .
"
4. Major private shipyard employment on MARAD con-
struction projects had dropped in 1966 and 1967 to 6,000
production employees per day from the 1962 high of 14,000
men per day.
Probably more basic than the above were the lack of
precise policy objectives against which the system designed
to foster the maritime policy could be judged. The 1936 Act
stipulates that a merchant marine is necessary for both
commercial and national defense purposes. The measure of
the former is its ability to carry a "substantial portion"
of waterborne foreign trade, and that of the latter is its
ability to serve as a naval auxiliary. "Substantial portion"
was never defined and although the loss of U. S. flag carryings
was decried a policy target was never set.
Likewise with national defense nowhere were the merchant
marine and shipbuilding capabilities explicitly stated. There
is no true commercial need for a shipbuilding industry in the
U. S. as the peacetime demand for ships can be met by ships
built in foreign shipyards. The construction subsidy was
MARAD, Annual Report FY 1967
, pp. 19-20.





looked upon as not only providing ships, but primarily as
providing additional capacity to build ships because our
wartime shipping needs have always exceeded our peacetime
needs. One attempt to define a national defense policy was
MARAD's 1954 recommendation of a 60 ship per year construction
program which would also employ the minimum recommended defense
nucleus of 36,000 production employees. This nucleus, based
upon a World War II type conflict, was never seriously con-
sidered by Congress. Another attempt was made by the 1965
Interagency Task Force on Maritime Policy in their proposal
that the Government buy no more of a subsidized activity than
required to meet non-economic (in this case national defense)
needs. They recommended an annual construction subsidy cal-
culated to provide the private shipbuilding capacity necessary
to meet national defense needs only. If U. S. flag operators
had commercial needs for ships beyond that capacity they could
build them in foreign yards with no subsidy. While they did
not explicitly state what the national defense objectives
should be they did project a 20 year, 21 ship per year (17 of
which were to be subsidized) construction program in U. S.
shipyards employing 14,700 production workers. While some
U. S. Department of Commerce, The Merchant Marine in
National Defense and Trade - A Policy and a Program , Report of
the Interagency Maritime Task Force (Washington, D. C. : U. S.
Department of Commerce, 1965), pp. 2-6 and Exhibit II.
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other recommendations of the Task Force were included in the
Merchant Marine Act of 1970, the one to set a national
defense objective for shipbuilding was not.
In the absence of definite commercial and national
defense objectives the achievement of parity became the
primary object of Federal maritime policy. It also provided
the yardstick against which the success or failure of
government policy was measured. Ship operators and ship-
yards insisted that subsidies must provide parity for the
program to be a success and others measured the program's
failure by the subsidy percentages necessary to attain
parity.
Merchant Marine Act of 1970
The resulting government action was a major revision
to the 1936 Act which is so broad as to be labeled the Mer-
chant Marine Act of 1970. Proposed to Congress by President
Nixon on October 23, 1969, the Act passed both the House and
Senate with one lone dissent each and was signed into law
(P.L. 91-469) on October 21, 1970. The principle provisions
of the Act are as follows. They will be analyzed in greater
detail in subsequent chapters.
Merchant Marine Act of 1970, Public Law 91-469
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1. A declaration of national policy that "... there
should be authorized and appropriated for fiscal years 1971
through 1980 such sums as may be necessary to construct 300
ships . . . "
.
2. The construction program features standardized ship
designs, multi-year procurement contracts to facilitate series
construction, payment of construction subsidies direct to
shipyards, and permits negotiated contracts between shipyards
and operators. Since these measures are expected to lower
production costs the Act set construction subsidy limits of
50 per cent after June 30, 1970, 45 per cent in fiscal year




The establishment of a Commission on American
Shipbuilding to review the progress of the shipyards in meet-
ing the 1976 construction subsidy goal, to recommend alterna-
tives to the program if it finds that the 1976 target cannot
be met, and to recommend actions by the Government and industry
to improve the competitive position of the industry in the
world shipbuilding market. The Commission's report is due
in 1973 except that if the Secretary of Commerce enters into




then current ceiling, the Commission's report is due within
six months of that event.
4. Expansion of construction aids. The mortgage
guarantee program is expanded and tax-deferred construction
reserve funds are extended to unsubsidized foreign trade and
noncontiguous domestic trade operators.
5. The extension of construction and operating sub-
sidies to bulk carriers in foreign trade which should
"... eventually lead to elimination of premium freight
rates paid for the transportation of government-sponsored
cargoes .
"
6. A restructuring of seafaring wage subsidies which
ties them to a national wage index rather than negotiated
industry wage agreements.
The goals of the new maritime program are to provide
a foreign trade merchant fleet in 1980 of 583 ships. The
fleet is expected to have the same carrying capacity as did
our 1969 fleet of 942 ships. Because the construction program
emphasizes highly productive ships (container, barge/lighter
carrying, tankers, dry bulk, and combination oil/bulk/ore),
and because MARAD has started a priority program of market
development for U. S. ships, the fleet is projected to carry
1




about 15 per cent of our 1980 foreign trade tonnage. It is
anticipated by MARAD that over 56 per cent of the 1980 fleet
will be less than 10 years old, and less than 7 per cent will
be over 20 years old.
The 1970 provisions strengthen, modify, and expand the
concepts of the original 1936 Act. First the concept of
parity through direct subsidies is strengthened by the decision
to subsidize bulk carriers and to phase out the indirect
subsidy provisions of cargo preference rate differentials.
Second the Act is no longer a liner act committed to maintain
service on selected routes, but is an expanded foreign trade
fleet act with a long range (10 year) commitment of new
construction ships and expanded trade carryings. Third U. S.
shipbuilders are for the first time made equal partners with
the merchant marine in the considerations provided under the
Act. The long range building program as described by President
Nixon in his proposal to Congress was intended to encourage
builders to standardize ship designs and introduce the mass
production techniques which have kept other U. S. industries
competitive. Unlike the merchant marine however, the ship-
builder incentives contain a threat ("challenge" in the words
of the President) . In describing the reducing scale of




construction subsidies required by the Act the President
stated;
We are confident that the shipbuilding industry-
can meet this challenge. If the challenge is not met,
however, then the Administration's commitment to this
part of our program will not be continued.
The President's threat to the shipbuilding industry had been
made clear just a few weeks prior to his statement, when Jack
W. Carlson, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget
for Program Evaluation listed the "Construction of Merchant
Ships Abroad" among 70 major policy issues under review for
fiscal year 1971. 2
Summary
U. S. maritime policy has been developed on the basis
of protectionism and maintenance of cost parity with foreign
competitors. The protectionist aspects restrict U. S.
registry to U. S. built ships and specify U. S. registry as
a requirement to engage in certain U. S. trades. Cost parity
is achieved through direct government subsidy of ship operating
U. S. President, "Message to Congress on the United
States Merchant Marine, Oct. 20, 1969," United States Naval
Institute Proceedings, XCVI, No. 5/807 (1970), 354.
2 ...
U. S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Economic
Analysis and the Efficiency of Government, Hearings , before
the Subcommittee on Economy in Government, 91st Cong. , 1st
sess. , 1970, p. 695.
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and construction costs. Its purpose has been to develop
and maintain a merchant marine adequate for both commercial
and national defense needs, and more recently (since 1946)
to supplement the merchant marine with an efficient ship-
building and repair industry.
In practice Federal policy has failed to explicitly
state commercial and national defense objectives for the
merchant marine and the shipbuilding industry. The merchant
marine has experienced large expansion during wartime followed
by peacetime periods of declining size, cargo carryings, and
prosperity. Government peacetime subsidy programs have
primarily benefited only the subsidized liner segment of
the fleet. Likewise the merchant shipbuilding industry has
built the major share of its ships as the result of wartime
programs. In peacetime it has been dependent upon the size,
age, prosperity, and degree of government support provided
to the U. S. merchant marine.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1970 has for the first
time set national policy goals for peacetime construction
and employment of the merchant marine. Subsidy support is
expanded to include all segments of the foreign trade fleet
and it is designed to make the shipbuilding industry a co-
equal partner with the merchant marine.

III. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MARITIME SUBSIDIES
Introduction
Federal maritime policy has provided substantial
support of the U. S. shipping and shipbuilding industries
primarily through the Merchant Marine Act, 1936 as amended.
This support is in the form of direct and indirect subsidies,
preferences, loans and loan guarantees, special provisions in
the tax structure, and cabotage laws.
Federal funding for maritime programs is a single line
item "Merchant marine aids" within the Federal Budget Water
Transportation Section of the Commerce and Transportation
Programs. The Merchant marine aids appropriation is further
divided into its elements under the Ocean Shipping-Maritime
Administration classification in the Budget and Appendix to
the Budget. Although the above functional budget classification
is ostensibly designed to arrange Federal programs by "mutually
exclusive categories according to their principle purpose,
regardless of the agency administering the program, " a number
U. S. Bureau of the Budget, The Budget of the United
States Government Fiscal Year 1971 (Washington, D. C.
:
Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 74. (Subsequent Budget






of maritime subsidy programs are either fractioned between
other agencies or not identified in the Budget or in the
Federal appropriation process.
Because of this the total cost and effect of subsidy-
programs for the maritime industry are difficult to identify.
In testimony before the Joint Economic Committee former
Budget Director Charles Schultze stated the direct and
2indirect costs to be $500 million per year. In the same
hearings Prof. Leonard A. Rapping of Carnegie - Mellon
Institute, and a co-author of a 1961 study to determine the
3
economic value of the merchant marine, estimated the total
maritime subsidy in fiscal year 1965 to be at least $550
4 .....
million. The subsidy program of the Maritime Administration
Ocean Shipping Budget, however, total only 60 per cent of
these estimates.
1Ibid
. , p. 116 and pp. 281-283.
2
Joint Economic Committee, Economic Analysis and the
Efficiency of Government, Hearings , p. 794.
3
Allen R. Ferguson, et al . , The Economic Value of the
United States Merchant Marine (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern
University Press, 1961)
.
4Joint Economic Committee, Economic Analysis and the





A break down of the various subsidy programs is
contained in Table 3. Each is classified as to function,
administrating agency, whether identified in the Ocean
Shipping Budget, and appropriate section of the Merchant
Marine Act, 1936.
Major areas not considered are the benefits to the
U. S. maritime industry resulting from the substantial
Federal funding of harbor improvements, canals, dredging of
rivers, charting of waters, and placement and maintenance of
navigational aids. Also, as will be developed later, the
subsidy effects of U. S. military shipments and military aid
shipments are not considered. In addition one could take
the position that the entire MARAD Budget is a subsidy in
support of the maritime industry. Such an approach would
equate with labeling the Department of Commerce expenditures
as a subsidy to U. S. business. The approach here is however
to limit the extent of subsidies considered to only those
having a direct effect on the maritime industry and within
the Joint Economic Committee definition.
Two subsidies, school assistance and medical benefits,
will not be discussed further. Both assist in providing a
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a. Construction- MARAD Yes TITLE V
Differential
Subsidy
b. Trade-in MARAD Yes SEC 510
Allowance
c. Loan/Mortgage MARAD Yes TITLE XI
Aid
d. Special Tax MARAD No TITLE VI
Provisions
e. Government MARAD Yes TITLE VII
Construction
Other Subsidies
a. Cargo VARIOUS No SEC 901
Preference and other
b. Ship Exchange MARAD No SEC 510
c. War Risk MARAD Yes TITLE XII
Insurance
d. Cabotage Not App. No
e. School MARAD Yes SEC 216
Assistance and other




ship construction are remote. The former subsidy operates
the U. S. Merchant Marine Academy and provides Federal
assistance to five state maritime schools under section
216 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936 and the Maritime
Academy Act of 1958 respectively. Together these schools
graduate approximately 620 licensed deck and engine officers
per year. The fiscal year 1972 appropriation for school
assistance was $9.5 million. Under the medical benefits
subsidy officers and men of the merchant marine are provided
free medical treatment in U. S. Public Health Service
hospitals. This subsidy is not identified separately in
the Budget.
Operating-Differential Subsidy (OPS )
The operating-differential subsidy (ODS) is the
largest single maritime subsidy program in terms of dollars.
The cost of this program is appropriated annually under the
ODS classification in multi-year funds. In FY 1972 the
administrative cost of the program was funded separately as
an annual appropriation called "operating aids" under the
2MARAD salaries and expenses budget. In the years just
FY 1972 Budget Appendix , pp. 275-77
2
FY 1972 Budget Appendix , pp. 273-75
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prior to FY 1972 this cost was not identifiable as it was
included under the general administrative expense classifica-
tion. When quoting ODS expenditures, such as in their annual
report, MARAD does not include the administrative expense of
the program.
ODS is intended to compensate U. S. operators for the
difference between the U. S. flag costs and the cost of
operating a similar vessel in the same service under competi-
tive foreign flags. Prior to the Merchant Marine Act of 1970
subsidy payments were made for the difference in the cost of
wages, subsistence of officers and crew, maintenance, repairs,
and insurance. To be eligible for subsidy payments an operator
had to serve an essential foreign trade route; offer regularly
scheduled cargoliner service (dry and liquid bulk carriers not
eligible); operate vessels constructed in the U. S., repaired
in the U. S. (except for emergencies) , and manned by U. S.
citizens; agree to replace subsidized vessels with ones built
in U. S. shipyards and establish statutory reserve funds for
this purpose (see Special Tax Provisions) . Until 1970 a
subsidy recapture provision existed which returned to the
Government 50 per cent of earned profits in excess of 10 per
cent of "capital necessarily employed."





These provisions were modified by the Merchant Marine
Act of 1970 which extended coverage to operators of bulk
carriers engaged in foreign trade, restricted ODS subsidies
to differentials in wage and insurance costs, tied the
allowable wage escalation to a national wage index, and
eliminated the recapture provision. The escalation provision
is important because heretofore the Government was required to
include the costs of any increased operating expenses resulting
from collective bargaining agreements in the wage costs
eligible for ODS. The Government in effect paid at least 70
per cent of all wage increases and the incentive for subsidized
operators to hold down wage increases in union bargaining was
lessened.
There are presently thirteen operators participating
in ODS with a total of 247 ships under contract. The impact
of ODS payments to these operators is evident from the sub-
sidized operators condensed income statements compiled by
MARAD. For calendar years 1968-1969 ODS payments totaled
MARAD, Annual Report FY 1970 , p. 4.
2 . .Based on 1965 data for fifteen subsidized operators
which shows that the wage subsidy (including fringe benefits)
amounted to 73 per cent of wage costs. Ernst and Ernst, U. S
.
Maritime Industry Economic and Financial Data , Report prepared
for Long Range Objectives Group Office of Chief of Naval
Operations, Navy Dept.
,
(Washington, D. C.: Defense Documen-
tation Center, 1967), p. 52.

54
45.7 per cent and 48.8 per cent respectively of costs in the
subsidizable categories; in terms of total voyage expenses
ODS was 21.7 and 23.7 per cent respectively. 1 ' 2 The total
ODS expenditures in recent years are contained in Table 4.
The additional administrative costs are only known from the
FY 1972 budget request, but can be assumed constant over
3
recent years at $3.65 million.
Two provisions of the 1970 Act should be more fully
explained as they effect the financial condition of the
subsidized operators. First the Government allowance of
seafaring employee wage increases has not been a one way
street. Wage costs have been subject to MARAD review and
after the fact disallowance for subsidy as not being "fair
and reasonable". This procedure with its Subsidy Board
hearings and appeals resulted in a large backlog of pending
ODS rate decisions. The extent of these in 1970 was such
that the Board reached agreement with most operators to
extend the 1965 subsidy rates through calendar 1968 in order
to concentrate on 1969 and subsequent years. The wage index
MARAD, Annual Report FY 1970 , p. 73.
2
MARAD, Annual Report FY 1969 , p. 78.
Calculated average for FY 1970-1972 from, U. S
























1970 74,999 21,723 96,723 205,732
1969 95,460 57 95,517 194,703
1968 97,611 97 97,707 200,130
1967 81,593 932 82,525 175,632
1966 70,811 2,572 73,383 186,628
1965 87,649 38 87,687 213,334
1964 77,234 1,665 78,900 203,037
1963 90,514 4,181 94,696 220,677
1962 136,858 4,161 141,019 181,919
1961 102,119 1,215 103,334 150,143
1960 69,157 4,828 73,985 152,756
1959 21,680 7,065 28,745 127,693
1958 22,638 4,709 27,347 120,032
1957 16,379 3,909 20,288 108,292
1956 1,614 14,369 15,982 135,342
Total 1,046,315 71,523 1,120,838 2,576,048
Source MARAD, Annual Report FY 1970 , p. 22.
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provision of the 1970 Act eliminates the retrospective review
of wage costs which has been the major factor in subsidy-
disallowances. Subsidy litigations and allowable ship
manning are also being reduced under a revision to Section
603 (c) which permits MARAD to set the number of officers
and crew which will be allowed under subsidy prior to the
award of the vessel's construction contract, and exempts
MARAD from being bound by the manning and wage scales set
by collective bargaining agreements. One tangible result
of this provision is MARAD ' s announcement that whereas the
manning scales for the initial group of 11 LASH ships were
38, subsequent vessels of this class will receive subsidy
for 32. 1
Secondly the repeal of the subsidy recapture provision
was on the basis that the 48 per cent corporate tax introduced
subsequent to the 1936 Act accomplish the same purpose. The
validity of this reasoning is evidenced by the fact that in
the period 1958-1969 recapture accruals amounted to $36.5
million or 1.6 per cent of the net (after recapture deducted)
2payable subsidy.
MARAD, Annual Report FY 1970 , pp. 4, 6, and 19.




As discussed in Chapter II, MARAD in 1954 inaugurated
a replacement program for the subsidized fleet. Prior to
1971 all new construction subsidy funds were allotted to this
program. Operators receiving ODS were required to enter into
contracts with the Government to replace their ships prior to
the statutory age of 20 years; extended in I960, to 25 years
for ships built after 1946 by P.L. 86-518 in order to adjust
the program to the financial capabilities of the operators.
The results in terms of ships constructed are discussed under
construction-differential subsidy. The point to be made here
is that Section 605 (b) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936
permits continued payment of ODS to overage ships when it is
found to be in the public interest. A measure of the ineffec-
tiveness of ODS to encourage ship replacement (Ultimately
dependent upon the financial position of the operators, the
profit potential of new ships, and the amount of construction
subsidy appropriated annually by the Government.) and thereby
expend ODS funds in less productive ships is evident in the
degree to which this waiver provision has been utilized.
Table 5 is a compilation of the overage ships receiving ODS
under waiver. As late as 1969, 28 per cent of the ships were















































Source: MARAD, Annual Reports FY 1956-1970 .
Notes:
aIncludes those ships to be replaced one year or more
later than statutory date.
Overage range for all years has been 1 to 10 years.
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overage or scheduled to be replaced at least one year beyond
the statutory age.
Construction Aids
Construction - Differential Subsidy (CDS)
Until the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 CDS was in
practice applied only to the construction or reconstruction
of passenger, passenger-cargo, and breakbulk dry cargo ships
built for operators receiving ODS . While the Long Range
Shipping Act of 1952 repealed a restriction requiring ships
constructed with CDS to be operated on essential foreign
trade routes and thereby made CDS available to any U. S.
vessel in foreign commerce, this authority went unused and
CDS funds have been expended solely for the subsidized lines
(lines receiving ODS) fleet replacement program. The Merchant
Marine Act of 1970 now extends CDS to ships built for unsub-
sidized foreign trade operators including dry bulk and tanker
vessels
.
Under CDS the Government pays the difference between
the U. S. shipyard cost and a "fair and reasonable" estimate
2
of cost of constructing the ship in a foreign shipyard.
Since foreign shipyards do not bid for subsidized construction,
MARAD, Annual Report FY 1970 , p. 3.
Merchant Marine Act, 1936, Sect. 502 (b) .
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their bid must be simulated through MARAD computed estimates.
Because the ship is never built in a foreign shipyard there
is no way of testing the accuracy of the estimate. On occasion
MARAD has purchased foreign bids for similar type ships but
even these must be corrected for price level changes, ship
design differences, and regulatory differences in construction
standards. Despite the inability to measure the system's
accuracy it has been accepted by all parties (operators,
administrators, Congress and auditors) as satisfying the
legislative intent of the subsidy.
Heretofore an individual subsidy determination was
made for each vessel or contract, but under the 1970 Act
MARAD is authorized to compute the CDS rate on the estimated
costs for a type of vessel. Based on this provision MARAD
has proposed determining for each type of vessel the estimated
domestic and foreign costs for a vessel design which is repre-
sentative of the type and then applying the CDS rate derived
from these two estimates to the domestic price of any vessel
of that type to be constructed. An example of the types
considered are tankers, oil/bulk/ore carriers, dry bulk
carriers, LASH (lighter carrier) , SeaBee (barge carrier)
,




containerships, LNG carriers (liquid natural gas), and one
type for reconstruction of breakbulk cargo ships to con-
tainerships. Depending upon the range of sizes in a type,
the type may also be subdivided into size groups. This
procedure not only simplifies the CDS determination but
also provides the ship operators and shipyards with a
subsidy planning figure that can be relied on.
In addition to CDS the Government pays the total
cost of national-defense features (NDF) which are considered
necessary by the Navy and considered to be in excess of
commercial requirements by the Maritime Subsidy Board. The
1936 Act set the statutory limit for CDS at 50 per cent of
the cost of the vessel (less NDF and special features paid
for by the owner) . In 1960 it was raised by Public Law
86-607 to 55 per cent because that was the expected rate
necessary to maintain parity. The House report accompanying
the bill stated that as the subsidized liner replacement
program increased it was expected that the differential would
2
again drop to 50 per cent. As of June 30, 1970 the 1970 Act
dropped the limit to 50 per cent and a target differential of
Maritime Administration, "Determination of Construction-
Differential Subsidy by Type of Vessel," Federal Register ,
XXXVI, No. 80, April 24, 1971, 7751-7752.
2
Little, Ship Construction Subsidies , p. 54.
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45 per cent was set for FY 1971 with a two per cent decrease
per year until 1976 , when thereafter a 35 per cent rate shall
apply.
Table 6 summarizes the subsidized postwar ship
replacement program since its inception by Fiscal Year in
which the contracts were awarded. Except for two oil/bulk/
ore carriers awarded in FY 1971 (under the 1970 Act) all the
ships in the replacement program have been for the shipping
lines receiving ODS . The CDS rate of Table 6 is a gross rate
calculated on the basis of total contract award and total CDS
for a fiscal year, and not the average rate for the contracts
awarded in that year. The gross rate provides a better
measure of government support to the shipbuilding industry.
For comparison purposes the CDS rates approved for contracts




There have been two means for contracting the construc-
tion of a vessel with CDS. Under Section 504 of the Merchant
Marine Act, 1936, both MARAD and an operator execute a contract
with the lowest responsible bidding shipbuilder. The Govern-
ment is responsible only for the CDS payment and the cost of
Merchant Marine Act, 1936 , Sect. 502 (b)
,

























1971 12 307.8 172.8 135.0 43.9
1970 5 109.0 58.4 49.8 45.8
1969 10 247.5 117.5 127.3 51.5
1968 12 250.5 124.6 124.8 49.9
1967 1 15.7 7.0 8.5 54.3
1966 17 254.4 117.7 133.0 52.7
1965 14 168.3 78.3 89.6 53.4
1964 15 156.0 71.7 84.0 54.0
1963 18 205.6 99.0 106.3 51.8
1962 13 128.9 65.1 63.4 49.3
1961 31 302.1 152.1 147.1 49.3
1960 13 170.3 87.4 81.5 48.2
1959 14 140.4 73.4 65.1 47.0
1958 15 166.9 87.4 77.9 47.0
1957
1956 4 94.9 55.6 38.6 41.0
TOTAL 194 2,718.3 1,368.2 1,331.9
Source: 1956 to 1970 data from MARAD, Annual Report FY 1970 ,
p. 23. 1971 data from Shipbuilders Council of
America, Shipyard Weekly , No. 26, July 1, 1971.
Figures are for original contract award only, and
exclude escalation, changes, and engineering and
outfitting budgets.
Contract award includes special features paid 100%
by owner and national defense features which are





national defense features. The operator in turn pays the
balance usually 25 per cent down and the remainder with a
25-year government insured mortgage loan under Title XI of
the Act. An alternative method under Section 502 permits
the Government to contract directly with the low bidding
shipyard for the full cost of the vessel and separately sell
it to an operator for cost less CDS and national defense
features. Because this method requires the Government to
finance the entire cost of the vessel it is not used.
A provision of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970
(Sections 502 (a) and 504) permit MARAD to accept negotiated
prices between shipyard and purchaser provided they are
found to be fair and reasonable and within the target
percentages of CDS. Section 501 also extends the eligibility
of application for CDS to any U. S. shipyard. The intent of
both provisions is to encourage shipyards to independently
develop or participate in the development of standard ship
designs which are value engineered for low production cost.
CDS is identified as a specific item in the ship
construction budget. The cost of national-defense features
(NDF) are included in the CDS total. NDF could be considered
a national defense cost with the subsidy to the U. S. ship-




costs and foreign costs for comparable features. Since NDF
averaged only about one per cent of CDS in the period 1954-
1970 it is not unreasonable to use the total CDS/NDF figure
as subsidy cost. CDS expenditures are summarized in Table
4. The amount expended for reconstruction of ships is only
six per cent of the total and is in line with government
policy that "financial aid shall be extended to reconstruction
2
or reconditioning only in exceptional cases ..." Most of
the conversions in this period have involved modification from
breakbulk cargo to container capability. Administrative
expenses associated with CDS have been located either within
the ship construction budget or within the salaries and
expenses budget. It is not included in MARAD's reports of
CDS costs. A reasonable estimate for CDS administration is
3$3.6 million per year.
The total of CDS plus ODS is the usual figure quoted
as the cost of the maritime subsidy programs.
Trade-in Allowance
The trade-in of a used ship to the Government in
exchange for an allowance of credit to be applied against
Ibid
. , p. 23
.
Merchant Marine Act, 1936 , Sect 501 (c) .
3
Estimated from ship construction administration
figures given in FY 1969 and FY 1970 Budget Appendices.
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the cost of a new U. S. built vessel is allowed by Section
510, Merchant Marine Act, 1936. The law calls for the
allowance to be "the fair and reasonable value of such
vessel". In 1967 the trade-in allowance was reported to be
the average of the domestic market and 90 per cent of the
world market value. The domestic market price was also
reported as having been higher than the world market since
2the end of 1960. The traded in ships are either placed in
the National Defense Reserve Fleet or sold.
Funds for acquisition of replaced ships are included
as a line item in the ship construction budget. Since the
Government does receive a ship in return for an allowance
which is reported to be slightly less than the domestic
market value of the ship there is no quantifiable subsidy.
The Government's readiness to accept obsolete ships towards
construction allowances is however a subsidy aid to the extent
that it encourages ship replacement.
Loan/Mortgage Aid
Under Title XI of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, MARAD
is authorized to insure construction loans and mortgages not
to exceed 87% per cent of the actual cost of vessels meeting
Merchant Marine Act, 1936 , Sect. 510 (d)
.
2
Ernst, Economic and Financial Data, p. 64
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certain size, speed, or type criteria. (Mortgage insurance
was also made available for barges and lighters to be carried
aboard ship by the 1970 Act.) On ships not meeting these
criteria and on those built under CDS the maximum is 75 per
cent of the actual cost. These loan guarantees are also
available for vessel reconstruction. At the end of FY 1970
$F919 million in mortgages were in force. The current
statutory limit on insured loans is $3 billion; raised from
£L billion by the 1970 Act. 2
Government insurance is available to U. S. operators
engaged in both foreign (subsidized and unsubsidized operators
aTfirlce) and domestic trades. While the major portion of this
assistance has gone to the subsidized foreign trade cargo
operators ship replacement program, 22 per cent of the vessels
covered by mortgage insurance on June 30, 1970 were tankers
built without CDS and operated without ODS . Table 7 summar-
izes the results of the Federal Ship Mortgage Insurance
Program (FSMI) . Through June 30, 1970, 198 ships have been
3
covered by FSMI of which 171 contracts are still in force.
MARAD, Annual Report FY 1970 , p. 24.
2
Merchant Marine Act, 1936 , Sect. 1103 (e)
.
3
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Insurance of these loans by the Government enables
operators to obtain loans at more favorable interest rates
than would otherwise be possible. In mid-1965 to mid-1966
loans to subsidized operators was reported to have been at
an interest rate of approximately 5 per cent. The operator
also pays an insurance premium to the Government of h to h.
. 1per cent.
The Federal Ship Mortgage Insurance program (FSMI) is
operated as a public enterprise fund. The redemption of
defaulted loans or mortgages is financed from insurance
premiums, interest earned on government securities held by
the fund, and amounts which the Secretary of Commerce is
authorized to borrow from the Treasury. The cost of
administering the fund is included in the operating aids
2
expense discussed under ODS . The cost to the Government
is small so long as there are no defaults. Since the start
of the program only 4 per cent of the contracts have
defaulted, the fund has not had to borrow from the Treasury
since 1961, and the fund now has a retained income of over
3$25 million.
Ernst, Economic and Financial Data , pp. 63-64.
2
FY 1972 Budget Appendix , p. 275-77.
3
Based on summarized data from MARAD Annual Reports
FY 1958 to FY 1970.
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Section 509 of the Merchant Marine Act also allows
for the construction of merchant vessels wherein the pur-
chaser makes a down payment of 12^ per cent plus pays the
costs of a 25 year mortgage held by the Government. The
mortgage interest rate was 3^ per cent until changed to a
rate commensurate with the average market yield on Treasury
securities by the Merchant Marine Act, 1970. This direct
mortgage aid has not been used since mid-1950. In FY 1970
there were $12.9 million in loans still outstanding and
2FY 1972 estimate was $9.9 million. The subsidy effect of
these loans is the difference between the 3^ per cent interest
rate and the higher market rate which the Treasury must pay to
finance the public debt. The gross effect of all such interest
subsidies are already included in the budget as the interest
on the public debt is higher than it would be if the interest
income equaled the cost to the Treasury of capital tied up in
outstanding loans. Assuming a Treasury borrowing rate of 4^
per cent, and a loan maturity in 10 years the current interest
Lawrence, U. S. Shipping Policies , p. 169.
2
FY 1972 Budget Appendix, p. 277.
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There are a number of special tax deductions, exclu-
sions, credits, exemptions, and preferential rates designed
into the Federal tax structure. Most of these provisions
serve the same purpose as direct Federal expenditures,
Federal loans, or Federal guarantees of private loans.
They are in effect tax expenditures. They are however
not listed in the Federal Budget as line item revenue
losses or expenditures of tax money foregone for a specific
purpose. Generally they are not considered by the Federal
2
agencies and Congress during the annual budget reviews.
Examples applicable to industry are investment credits,
capital gains on corporate income tax, and excess deprecia-
tion allowances.
The tax provision peculiar to the merchant marine is
in the form of an indefinite deferral of income tax for
President's Commission on Budget Concepts, "Problems
in Implementing a Capital Budget for Loans" (staff paper) in
Brookings, Budget Concepts for Economic Analysis (Washington,
D. C. : Brookings, 1968), pp. 43-47.
2
Joint Economic Committee, Economic Analysis and the
Efficiency of Government, Hearings , supplementary statement
of Asst. Secretary of Treasury Joseph W. Barr, 1970, p. 133.
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income deposited in certain reserve funds. The 1936 Act
established certain statutory reserve funds for ship
operators holding ODS contracts. The purposes were to
provide for the replacement and acquisition of ships,
prompt payment of obligations to the Government, and
continued maintenance and operation of subsidized ships.
Operators are required to deposit into the reserve funds;
depreciation accruals on subsidized vessels; net proceeds
of insurance, indemnities from total loss, proceeds from
sale or other disposition of subsidized vessels including
trade-in allowances paid by the Government; net profits
from subsidized operations in excess of 10% capital
necessarily employed; income earned on securities held in
the funds; and voluntary deposits (which may be made with
1 2
MARAD approval) . '
Funds may be withdrawn from the reserves only for
the purpose of ship construction, reconstruction and ship
mortgage loan payments of subsidized ships. Withdrawals




The reserve funds have been consolidated into one
"capital construction fund" and extended to include all U. S
flag operators in foreign trade or noncontiguous domestic
trade by the Merchant Marine Act of 1970. This change has




for other purposes or upon termination of the operating
subsidy contract are taxable. Investment of reserve funds
in securities and common stocks (up to a statutory limit)
are not considered withdrawals.
The indefinite deferral of taxes on the reserve funds
has a net effect similar to an interest free loan. The
Government allows the ship owner to have the use of the
taxes it owes so long as it is to be used at some future
date for ship construction. It is just as if the ship
owner had paid his tax and then borrowed a like amount from
the Government interest free for use towards ship construction.
Thus the tax deferrals are a form of ship construction subsidy
not appropriated by Congress.
The costs of the tax deferral subsidy are difficult to
determine because the tax provisions of Section 607 of the
Merchant Marine Act, 1936 (Prior to the revision incorporated
in the Merchant Marine Act, 1970) were not drafted in tax
language. In administering the tax deferral provisions of
the reserve funds the Internal Revenue Service has had to
enter into interpretive contracts with each firm. Therefore
1
U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, Merchant Marine Act of 1970, Hearings , before
the Sub-Committee on Merchant Marine. Statement of Thomas F.




the provisions may apply in different ways to different
firms
.
As of June 30, 1970 the combined total of the reserve
funds was in excess of $95 million and as of December 31,
1969 the retained earnings on which taxes have been deferred
2
amount to in excess of $633.7 million. The subsidy cost of
the interest free deferral was estimated at $9 million per
3year for the period 1958-1962 by Lawrence, and more recently
4in 1968 at $10 million per year by the U. S. Treasury.
There is one other reserve fund; it is the voluntary
construction reserve fund under Section 511 of the Merchant
Marine Act, 1936. This fund open to all operators has been




MARAD, Annual Report 1970
, pp. 74 & 77.
3
Lawrence, U. S. Shipping Policies , p. 209.
4
U. S. Treasury Department "The Tax Expenditure Budget:
A Conceptual Analysis," Secretary of Treasury Annual Report
FY-1968 (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office, 1969),
pp. 334-35.
5 ....
U. S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration,
A Review of Direct and Indirect Types of Maritime Subsidies
with Special Reference to Cargo Preference Aid , (Washington,




Under Title VII of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936 MARAD
is authorized to have constructed or reconditioned in U. S.
shipyards (including navy yards if satisfactory contracts
cannot be made with private yards) such new vessels as it
determines necessary to carry out the objectives of creating
a merchant marine adequate for essential foreign trade
commerce. Such action must be based upon a finding, approved
by the President that the objectives of the Act cannot be met
by the provisions of Titles V(CDS) and VI(ODS). The vessels
are to be sold or chartered to private operators; or where
necessary operated for MARAD by private operators. Title
VII has been applied to merchant ships in only two instances;
1. In 1951 the construction of 35 Mariner Class
(12500 tons, 20 knot) dry cargo vessels was authorized as a
national defense measure. At the time of construction there
was no operator interest in these larger high speed vessels
but 29 were eventually sold to private operators. Most were
sold after MARAD in 1956 set a price of $4.4-4.9 million per
2
ship as compared to the estimated cost of $8.4 million each.
Merchant Marine Act, 1936 , Sections 210, and 701-704.
2
Wytze Gorter, United States Shipping Policy (New York
Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 55.
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MARAD itself lists the total CDS equivalent of the Mariner
Program at $105.9 million or over $3.6 million per ship sold.
2. In 1954 MARAD initiated an emergency ship repair
program to upgrade more than 200 ships of the NDRF under
PL 83-608, again as a national defense measure. Through
fiscal year 1956 only 150 ships were repaired and modernized
(at least 90 of which were Navy auxiliaries) at a cost of
2$16.7 million. Much of this work was done in other than
the major private shipyards.
The Merchant Marine Act, 1970/ by adding the "creation
. . . . . 3
and maintenance of efficient shipyards and repair capacity..."
in the U. S. as an objective of merchant marine policy, makes
Title VII ship construction applicable as a means to further
that objective. However since a basic intent of the 1970 Act
is to encourage greater private investment and initiative
there is no possibility that Title VII will be used short of
a national defense crisis.
MARAD, Annual Report FY 1970 , p. 22.
2
MARAD, Annual Report FY 1955 , p. 2; MARAD, Annual Re-
port FY 1956 , p. 2.





Cargo preference is the most important non-appropriated
(non-appropriated in the sense that it is not a line item in
the Budget document) subsidy aid to the U. S. Merchant Marine.
In general it is legislation which requires at least 50 per
cent participation by U. S. flag vessels in the transport of
cargoes which would not exist except for their generation by
U. S. Government purchases, loans, grants, payment guarantees,
or acceptance of foreign currency.
The subsidy effect of the various cargo preference
programs is the difference between the rate paid U. S. flag
vessels under its protected share of the cargo and that
which would be paid if the cargo were carried by a foreign
vessel in the open market. This rate differential is generally
higher for non-liner ships than for liner ships, since in the
latter case shipping rates are generally set by international
steamship conferences.
Aside from the indirect subsidy of higher cargo rates
the effect of cargo preference programs on the U. S. flag
merchant marine in terms of employment is appreciable. As
indicated by Table 8 since 1960 Public Law 664 cargo alone
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U. S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration,
Office of Market Development, All Agencies (Except Dept. of
Defense) Summary of P.L. 664 Exports and Imports 1956-1969 ,
(Mimeographed)
.
Calculated from: U. S. Department of Commerce,
Maritime Administration, MARAD 1970 , (Washington, D. C.
:
Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 27.
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oceanborne carryings. For the non-liner dry cargo portion
of the U. S. flag fleet the dependence on preference cargoes
is much higher. In 1964 it was estimated to be 60 per cent
of their carryings, and in 1967, when preference cargoes
were at their lowest because of Vietnam shipping requirements,
2
it was 3 2 per cent of their carryings. The principle
legislative assistance in this area are:
1. Act of April 28, 1904 - This act applies to U. S.
military cargoes and requires 100 per cent employment of
U. S. flag vessels "to the extent that such vessels are
3
available at reasonable rates." The premium rates accruing
to U. S. flag vessels under this act can be attributed to a
pure national defense requirement to assure an adequate U. S.
flag fleet to meet military shipping requirements. The
subsidy costs of this program should therefore be identified
in the Budget under the national defense program, (It is not
so identified in the Budget.) and therefore will not be
considered in totalling the cost of the ocean shipping
program. It is interesting to note however that there is
no reliable method for calculating the premium rate subsidy
Ernst, Economic and Financial Data
, p. 68.
2
Barker, Merchant Marine in National Perspective
, p. 52
3
MARAD, A Review of Direct and Indirect Types of
Maritime Subsidies
, (1956), p. 19.
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resulting from military shipments. Lawrence has estimated
that defense cargo contract rates have averaged 40-50 per
cent above that obtainable in open competition and he
estimates the total premium rate subsidy to be $50 million
per year for the pre-Vietnam period of 1954-1964.
The military shipping demand is highly variable and
generally not one upon which a private shipowner can depend
for employment (An exception to this is the small number of
privately owned ships which have been built specifically for
long term charter to the Military Sealift Command (MSC) . The
ships fill basic military needs and since they operate almost
as an arm of the Government fleet will not be considered
further.) Most of the U. S. tramp fleet and many U. S.
liners were employed by MSC to carry military supplies during
Fiscal Years 1966-1969. For example at the end of calendar
1968 MSC was employing 44 subsidized dry cargo ships, 116
unsubsidized dry cargo ships, and 51 tankers. In ship numbers
this was 23 per cent of the privately owned U. S. flag ocean
going fleet. Within 6 months however the need for commercial
shipping had dropped to the extent that several tramp operators
were fearing bankruptcy, preference cargo rates were at a low,




and subsidized and unsubsidized operators were arguing for
preference in allocation of government cargoes
.
2. Public Resolution 17, 63rd Congress - This
resolution passed in 1934 as an intent of Congress states
that all exports financed through government loans shall be
carried in U. S. flag vessels to the extent that such ships
are available at reasonable rates. This resolution was
subsequently interpreted as not mandatory by the Attorney
General, but as a guide to be followed where feasible subject
2
to MARAD approval of waiver requests. At present most of the
exports under this provision are a result of U. S. Export-
Import Bank loans. There is no available accounting of the
premium rate subsidy paid to U. S. flag vessels under P.R. 17
through Export-Import loans. MARAD does estimate annually
the toal value of freight receipts accruing to U. S. flag
vessels under these loans and from this data Table 9 estimates
a conservative value for the premium rate subsidy for the
years 1961-1970.
3. The Cargo Preference Act - In the period 1948-1954
Congress consistently enacted legislation requiring at least
MARAD, Annual Report FY 1969
, pp. 6-7 and 66.
2
MARAD, A Review of Direct and Indirect Types of
Maritime Subsidies
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U. S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration,
Office of Market Development, Export-Import Bank P. R. 17




Estimate is based upon a U. S. flag differential of
50% above international rates, which assumes some cargo is
carried by liners, at conference rates, and in small volume.
This rate is the minimum reported in literature studied and




50 per cent of government sponsored economic and military
aid cargoes be carried by U. S. flag vessels. Then in 1954
Congress passed a permanent cargo preference statute (P.L.
83-664) which amended the Merchant Marine Act, 1936 to
require at least 50 per cent of the gross tonnage (computed
separately for dry bulk carriers, dry cargo liners, and
tankers) of U. S. Government sponsored cargoes (that
resulting from Government purchases, grants, advances,
credits or guarantees) be carried by U. S. flag commercial
vessels to the extent they "are available at fair and
reasonable rates for United States-flag commercial vessels."
This law has been the major source of the premium rate subsidy
to the U. S. merchant marine. The annual P.L. 664 tonnage and
its proportion to total U. S. flag ocean borne cargoes is
shown in Table 8. Public Resolution 17 and military cargoes
are not affected by this law.
The administration of shipments under this act are
dispersed among the number of government agencies whose
programs result in government sponsored cargoes. The largest
program under P.L. 664 has been the Agriculture Department
foreign assistance effort under Public Law 83-480. It has
Public Law 83-664 (The Cargo Preference Act) (1954)




averaged annually some 50 per cent of all shipments under
P.L. 664. The other major source of P.L. 664 cargo is the
Agency for International Development (AID) . It has averaged
some 35 per cent of shipments. Sources of lesser importance
have included the Inter-American Development Bank and General
Services Administration.
The total subsidy effect of P.L. 664 is not known.
The tonnage figures of Table 8 are even incomplete because
Mutual Defense Assistance (MDA) cargoes, which are administered
by the Department of Defense, are not included. While the
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries in House
Report 80 of the 84th Congress directed MARAD to exercise
general surveillance over the administration of the law, their
2
coordinating efforts have been basically ineffectual. The
Merchant Marine Act of 1970 has strengthened the position of
MARAD and now requires each department to administer its
program under regulations to be issued by the Secretary of
3Commerce. The results of this change are not evident as yet.
U. S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration,
Office of Market Development, All Agencies (Except Dept. of





MARAD, Annual Report, 1970
, p. 29.
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The only premium rate subsidy which is regularly
recorded is that of Title I and IV shipments of P.L. 480 by
the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) of the Department of
Agriculture. In both these cases CCC pays direct to the
U. S. carrier the differential between the U. S. flag rate
and the international rate. The total of this subsidy is
shown in column (4) of Table 10. By using this known subsidy
figure and by establishing a reasonable estimate for the
II. S. flag rate differential from the published estimates
summarized in Table 11 it is possible to calculate a
conservative estimate of the differential rate subsidy for
F.L. 664, column (5) of Table 10. Again it should be
remembered that Dept. of Defense MDA cargoes are not included
The effect of preference cargo has been basically to
assure a measure of employment to the U. S. merchant marine
and to underwrite the existence of unsubsidized liner and
tramp/bulk operators through employment at higher than world
shipping rates. The cargo preference statutes have none of
of the features of other subsidies of the Merchant Marine
Act, 1936 which encourage and/or require ship replacement
and modernization programs. Evidence of the result is;
Harbridge House, The Balance of Payments and the U. S





RATE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS OF P.L. 664
(Tons in Thousands of Long Tons; dollars in millions)
TOTAL INDIRECT EST. TOTAL
CARGO AGRICULTURE SUBSIDY SUBSIDY FOR
CALENDAR PREFERENCE PL, 480 TITLE TITLE I & IV ALL PL 664
YEAR TONS a I AND IV-TONS a CARGOES13 CARGOES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1970 d d $48,947
1969 7565 4215 66.236 $ 92.5
1968 7566 4303 69.121 95.3
1967 6480 3922 68.367 89.8
1966 8651 5736 75.747 94.0
1965 10478 6272 68.052 90.9
1964 12023 7598 76.732 99.1
1963 14119 7255 79.301 116.8
1962 12992 6290 59.455 91.1
1961 10920 5623 49.765 73.2
1960 10255 6239 54.205 71.7
1959 7345 4242 36.829 50.3
1958 8487 4445 30.779 44.8
1957 8116 3777 d
1956 7012 2451 d
a
S ource: MARAD, Office of Market Development, All
Agencies (Except Dept. of Defense) Summary of P .L. 664 Exports
and Impor ts 1956-1969, (M imeograph*2d) .
b
S ource: James R. Barker and Robert Brandwein, The
United St:ates Merchant Marine in National Perspiactive, (Lexing-
ton, Mass.: Heath Lexington Books, 1970), p. 35. (For data
1958-1967). U. S. Department of Agriculture, Commodity Credit
Corporation, Financial Analysis Division, Indirect Subsidies







Estimate based upon following assumptions:
(1) Subsidy differential for Title I & IV P.L. 480
Cargoes is assumed to be 200 per cent based upon Table 11
and the fact that most such cargo has been carried by non-
liners .
(2) Subsidy differential for P.L. 664 cargoes other
than Title I and IV shipment is 50% in excess of the foreign
rate. This lower rate is used because some of these cargoes
move in small volume and under conference tariff rates.





ESTIMATES OF U. S. FLAG RATE
DIFFERENTIALS FOR PREFERENCE AID
CARGO
U. S. Rate as Per cent
Source Item of Foreign Rate
Dept. of 1961-1966 Average for 241
Agriculture3" heavy grain shipments
from U. S. Gulf Coast
to East and West
coasts of India.
Lawrence Data for calendar year 216
1962 Agriculture P.L.
83-480 Title I and IV
shipments
Harbridge Data for calendar year 180 (Liner)
House 1964 Agriculture P.L. 200 (Non-liner)
83-480 Title I and IV
shipments
Calculated from Dept. of Agriculture data as presented
in U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Merchant
Marine Act of 1970, Hearings , before the Subcommittee on
Merchant Marine, Senate, on S3287, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1970,
pp. 696-97.
*U.
Calculated from data presented in Lawrence, U. S
.
Shipping Policies , p. 364.





1. The unsubsidized foreign trade U. S. flag liner
fleet, which in 1967 received 78 per cent of its tonnage
carryings from government and military cargoes, consisted
of Feb. 28, 1971 of 198 ships only 34 of which were less
than 25 years old and only 5 of which had been orginally
2
constructed without CDS. In other words this fleet depended
almost entirely upon vessels formerly built for the subsidized
operators
.
2. The foreign trade U. S. flag tramp/bulk fleet
which in 1967 received 70 per cent of its tonnage carryings
3from government and military cargoes, consisted on Sept. 30,
4
1970 of 105 ships, one of which was less than 25 years old.
Another effect of the preference cargo statutes is
that they do not restrict the U. S. portion to unsubsidized
Barker, U. S. Merchant Marine in National Perspective ,
p. 49.
2Lane C. Kendall, "The Merchant Marine Rationalize or
Nationalize," United States Naval Institute Proceedings ,
XCVII, No. 12/826 (1971), 42.
3
Barker, U. S. Merchant Marine in National Perspective ,
p. 49.
4
Lane C. Kendall, "Capable of Serving as a Naval and
Military Auxiliary, " United States Naval Institute Proceedings ,
XCVII, No. 819 (1971), 214.
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operators. This places them in competition with subsidized
operators for the same cargo at preferential rates. The
subsidized operators in effect receive a double subsidy for
the same cargo; preferential rates plus ODS . In the past
MARAD has stated that some subsidized liners find preference
cargo necessary on some trade routes to produce the volume
of traffic required to operate at a profit. The amount of
revenue obtained from preference cargoes by the subsidized
liners is a disputed figure. Barker estimates that only 4.1
per cent of the $610 million indirect Title I and IV cargo
subsidy from 1958-1967 (Col (4) of Table 10) was received
2by subsidized operators. Yet, m testimony before the Joint
Economic Committee/ Rapping has estimated the subsidy for
31964 alone at $75 million. Whatever the true value of the
double subsidy it provides an advantage to the subsidized
MARAD, Review of Direct and Indirect Types of
Maritime Subsidies (1956) , p. 34.
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operators which is not tied to any ship replacement
obligations
.
Under the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 CDS and ODS
assistance is extended to bulk carriers in foreign trade.
It is expected that the new bulk carriers will carry a major
share of government sponsored cargoes and should eventually
lead to the elimination of premium rates.
Ship Exchange Program
Under a ship exchange statute, first incorporated
into section 510 of the Merchant Marine Act in I960, 125
ships have been traded-in to the Government in exchange for
121 more modern or efficient vessels owned by the U. S.
2
reserve fleet. The law requires that (1) "fair and
reasonable" values shall be determined for the traded-in
and traded-out vessels as of the date of the exchange; (2)
the value of both vessels shall be calculated in the same
manner and the value of the traded-out vessel shall be
calculated in the same manner as its value was determined
An analysis of preference cargoes for 1964, which
estimated the rate subsidy to subsidized operators at $4.1
million for Title I and IV cargoes, basically agrees with
Barker. It also estimates the total preference rate differ-
ential including military cargoes for all carriers at $122
million. E. G. Frankel , Study of the Method, Effectiveness ,
and Potential of Government Subsidy to the U. S. Merchant
Marine
,
prepared for Office of Naval Research (Cambridge,
Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1968), pp. 36-44




when it was traded-in; and (3) vessels traded-in before
Oct. 1, 1960 shall be valued on a basis which yields the
"highest fair return" to the Government commensurate with
the intended purpose of the statute which is to improve the
non-subsidized U. S. flag merchant marine in domestic and
foreign service. It is an additional requirement that all
repairs and conversions of traded-out vessels be accomplished
in U. S. shipyards.
There can be three subsidy effects of this program.
The first is the benefit to operators resulting from the
Government's willingness to trade-out vessels in return for
obsolete vessels even if there is no monetary gain to the
operator in the exchange. The second is the monetary gain
to the operator if the Government does not require a monetary
payment to balance the excess value of the vessel traded-out
in the exchange. If this occurs it is a direct subsidy cost
to the Government. Finally the ship exchange program does
provide employment to U. S. Shipyards.
This author has been unable to resolve the magnitude
of a direct subsidy in the ship exchange program. Lawrence
states that the Government does resell traded-in vessels,




"usually at a small loss". Recently Barker estimated the
subsidy costs of the exchange program at $301 million for
2
the period 1960-1967. MARAD does not recognize any subsidy
effect of this program. On the contrary they publicize the
$24.4 million cash received in excess value of the ships
traded-out over those traded-in. This excess value has
averaged $200,000 per vessel traded-out for the life of the
program through 1970. In the more recent period of 1966-
3
1970 the average has been $285,000 per vessel. These
figures would appear to be minimal compensation considering
the probably poor condition of some of the trade-ins. (The
largest categories of trade-in vessels have been 31 old
4
Liberty ships and 22 ferries.)
Many of the ships traded-out are intended for
conversion to other types. For example in FY 1969 15 of the
17 ships traded-out were planned for conversion, 12 of them
Lawrence, U. S. Shipping Policy
, p. 225.
2
Barker, U. S. Merchant Marine in National Perspective ,
p. 34.
3
MARAD, Annual Report FY 1970
, pp. 13-14.
4
. .Detailed evidence of this is provided in an analysis
of the Exchange Program for the years 1961-1966 in Frankel,
Study of the Method, Effectiveness, and Potential of Government
Subsidy to the U. S. Merchant Marine
, pp. 21-3 5. Among other
factors Frankel notes that 72.5 per cent of the vessels traded




to containerships. It is apparent from the FY 1969 data,
which identifies trade-ins, trade-outs, conversion intended,
and cash received, that the ships to be converted were
traded-out at bargain rates in the interest of encouraging
operators to undertake the expense of the conversions.
From a review of the limited information available it
appears that;
1. there is a subsidy effect in the ship exchange
program.
2. Barker has over estimated the value of the subsidy
probably by costing the traded-out ships at their construc-
tion cost or a market value which is unrealistic considering
the fact that there is no market for vessels such as the 50
C-4 troop ships traded-out, other than as a conversion
. .
2possibility.
For lack of better data Barker's subsidy figures are
presented in column (3) of Table 12. There are in addition
administrative costs to the program which are included in
3the operating aids budget figure discussed under ODS . Of
MARAD, Annual Report FY 1969
, p. 31.
2
The C-4 ' s which represent better than 40% of the
vessels to be traded-out are all to be converted (26 to
containerships, 18 to breakbulk cargo, and 6 miscellaneous)
MARAD, Annual Report FY 1970
, p. 13.
.



















1970 1 n.a. n.a.
1969 17 n.a. n.a.
1968 22 32.0 89.2
1967 15 54.0 58.0
1966 13 41.0 42.3
1965 18 45.0 109.9
1964 16 50.0 39.2
1963 11 39.0 3.9
1962 4 22.0 8.2
1961 4 18.0 8.3
TOTAL 121 301.0 353.8
Source: (a) Columns (2) and (4) from MARAD, Annual
Report FY 1970
, p. 14. Column (4) is estimated cost
of putting traded-out ships to sea or to U. S. ship-
yards. 1968 figure is partial data for 16 ships.
(b) Column (3) is from Barker, U. S. Merchant
Marine in National Perspective
, p. 36. Calendar year
data has been converted to fiscal year by averaging
two years. 1968 data is through Dec. 31, 196 7 only.

96
mnre: interest in Table 12 is the employment gained by U. S.
shipyards. The only data available is an annual MARAD
estimate of the total cost of putting the traded-out ships
trx sea. or to the shipyards for repair and conversion. Since
most: have been converted, the conversion costs are the
largest factor in the MARAD figures. Some of this conversion
work, has gone to the major private shipyards, although much
has gone to yards specializing in conversion and repair.
War Risk Insurance
Under Title XII of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936 war
risk: insurance is available to any U. S. registered vessel.
Efc is also available to U. S. flag vessels transferred to
EANHQNLIB (Panama, Honduras, Liberia) flags or built by U. S.
citizens in foreign countries and registered under these
flags, provided the owners agree to make the ship available
tec the U. S. upon request in times of national emergency or
L
war... These ships are part of the Effective United States
Control Fleet (EUSC) previously discussed in Chapter I. War
risk insurance is financed by a revolving fund and there are
no budget obligations incurred except in the event of
extraordinary losses.







Title 46 U. S. Code 11 passed in 1817 restricts the
domestic trades to U. S. flag vessels constructed in the
U. S. The Merchant Marine Act, 1920 extended this restriction
to the non-contiguous trades with Alaska, Hawaii and other
possessions. Because of these protections of our domestic
trade fleet it does not receive direct subsidy support. Under
the 1936 Act they have been eligible for the Ship Exchange
Program, Federal Ship Mortgage Insurance, and war risk
insurance, and now under the 1970 Act are eligible for tax-
deferred construction reserve funds.
Summary
It is apparent from this chapter that the maritime
industry is the object of many and varied government subsidy-
effect programs. Their total cost in 1969, the latest year
with complete data, is at least $429 million; all but $7
million (subsidy program administrative expenses) of which
represents a direct benefit to the maritime industry. Even
this figure is considered low because it does not include
preference rates paid for military and military aid cargoes,
assumes a low preference rate for non-military cargoes (refer
to Tables 10 and 11) and assumes no subsidy for the Ship




Government policy to maintain cost parity between
U. S. and foreign ship operators is given effect primarily
through the direct operating-differential and construction-
differential subsidies. The cost parity concept is clouded,
however, by a plethora of indirect subsidies including
mortgage guarantees, cargo preference, tax benefits, cabotage
laws, and trade-in/trade-out programs, to the point that the
absolute costs and effects are almost impossible to measure.
Cargo preference aid, second only to operating-
differential subsidy in its annual cost, under-writes the
existence of antiquated U. S. flag unsubsidized liner and
non-liner fleets, while providing no incentives or requirements
for ship replacement. With its administration divided between
several agencies and the subsidy aspects of its funding not
identified in the Federal Budget, its costs and effects have
been shielded from the visibility that explicit agency
responsibility, and the executive and congressional budget
review processes were designed to provide.

IV. EVALUATION OF SUBSIDIES AS A STIMULUS TO
SHIP REPLACEMENT
The U. S. Merchant Marine is composed of several
diverse fleets operating in different economic environments.
Since the purpose here is to understand the effect of
government subsidy policy as a stimulus to ship construction
in U. S. shipyards it is desirable to select a grouping which
most clearly differentiates the economic effect of subsidies
on ship replacement. Such a grouping is;
1. Foreign trade dry cargo fleet composed of
subsidized and unsubsidized liners, and non-liners (tramps
and bulk carriers)
.
2. Domestic and foreign trade tanker fleet.
3. Domestic trade dry cargo fleet.
Foreign Trade Dry Cargo Fleet
The composition of the active foreign trade dry cargo
fleet is presented in Table 13 for the period 1958 to 1970.
While the number of ships in the fleet was fairly steady in





SIZE OF U. S. FLAG DRY CARGO








1970 247 146 105 498
1969 293 150 158 601
1968 303 150 164 617
1967 315 145 156 616
1966 322 143 135 600
1965 318 119 136 573
1964 317 131 137 585
1963 317 135 138 590
1962 298 133 144 575
1961 277 148 138 563
1960 278 144 144 566
1959 293 142 159 594
1958 305 139 147 591
Source: (1) 1958-1968 data from Barker, U. S. Merchant Marine
in National Perspective
, p. 39.





fleet increased by about 50 per cent as larger more productive
ships replaced those constructed during WW II. The reduction
in military cargoes for Vietnam is the major cause for the
fleet reduction in 1970.
The economic health of the U. S. shipping industry
depends directly upon the extent to which it participates in
U. S. foreign trade. While U. S. commercial and government
sponsored (excluding Department of Defense) foreign trade
cargoes available to liner and non-liner fleets has increased
70 per cent in the period 1958-1969, the U. S. flag portion
has decreased from 15.4 to 5.7 per cent and actual carryings
have decreased from 22.8 to 14.4 million tons. The decline
is greatest for the non-liner U. S. flag vessels which lost
50 per cent of the tonnage they carried in 1958. Indeed
the tramp segment of the non-liner fleet now depends almost
exclusively on military cargo under the preference statutes.
On September 30, 1970, 43 of the 64 tramp ships were chartered
2
to the Military Sealift Command.
Because of the moderate growth of the carrying capacity
of the U. S. flag fleet during the period the reduced carry-
ings resulted in declining load factors and therefore a lower
MARAD, Annual Report FY 1970
, p. 27.




return on investment. James Barker states that the average
vessel utilization rate declined from over 85 per cent in
1958 to about 65 per cent in 1967. The return on investment
figures for the subsidized operators during the period since
the start of the ship replacement program are shown in Table
14. Subsequent to the first 3 years of the program the
returns on investment have ranged from 6.47 to 3.11 per cent
and have been at their lowest level for the last three years.
Also shown in Table 14 is the long term debt-equity ratio
for the five year period 1965-1969. The steady trend of
increasing long term debt is the result of increased borrow-
ing necessary to finance new ships as the tax deferred reserve
funds have been depleted. As of June 30, 1970 only two of the
thirteen subsidized operators had sufficient reserve funds
remaining to pay the owner's cost for at least one ship at
2
present prices. In any event it is clear that unless the
subsidized operators can improve their financial condition
by a major increase in the amount of cargoes carried and
significant cost reductions they will be unable to continue
or increase the fleet replacement without increased govern-
ment support.
1
Barker, U. S. Merchant Marine in National Perspective
,
p. 52.






PROFITABILITY AND LONG-TERM FINANCIAL STRENGTH
($ in thousands)
STOCK- EARNINGS LONG DEBT-
HOLDER'S AFTER RETURN ON TOTAL TERM EQUITY
YEAR INVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT EQUITY DEBT RATIO
1969 $927,296 $29,514 3.18% $1,797,074 510,443 28.4%
1968 896,503 27,875 3.11 1,679,808 439,458 26.1
1967 966,904 33,979 3.51 1,702,247 419,378 24.7
1966 955,820 61,847 6.47 1,592,020 334,300 21.0
1965 907,677 39,157 4.31 1,451,192 277,860 19.1
1964 880,296 53,527 6.08 NA NA
1963 835,650 44,750 5.36 NA 318,744
1962 804,466 37,905 4.71 NA 270,259
1961 774,472 28,481 3.68 NA 243,089
1960 747,492 27,235 3.64 NA 235,792
1959 728,784 29,835 4.09 NA 198,478
1958 709,094 52,000 7.33 NA 177,602
1957 655,019 70,609 10.78 NA 179,543
1956 588,244 73,599 12.51 NA 171,716
Source: Based upon Combined Financial Statements for all
subsidized operators filed annually with the Maritime
Administration. Missing data not available.
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In effect the subsidy program has failed to provide a
merchant marine which in fact carries a substantial portion
of our foreign trade. The reasons for this are believed by
the author to be inherent in the nature and administration of
the program. Until the 1970 Act there was no action to
increase the U. S. flag share of foreign trade carryings
except to insure protection of government sponsored preference
cargoes. But more germane to this thesis are the failings of
the subsidy programs to come to grips with the economic
realities of the U. S. flag environment.
Subsidized Fleet Replacement Program
Almost from the start of the program it was evident
that major changes were needed for the U. S. flag fleet to
be commercially viable. At that time the major portion of
the subsidized fleet consisted of World War II built C2
breakbulk cargo ships. An analysis of representative 1958
cost data for these 15 knot, 8000 ton cargo capacity ships
showed that improvements in the ship itself would have little
effect on overall transportation costs and that radically
changed cargo handling and other means of reducing labor
costs were essential to attaining significant cost reductions.
This analysis showed;
1
Douglas C. MacMillan and T. B. Westfall, "Competitive
General Cargo Ships," Society of Naval Architects and Marine
Engineers Transactions
, LXVIII (1960), 837.
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1. Labor costs (both shipboard and cargo handling)
were the dominant factor in transportation costs representing
54-60 per cent of costs before subsidy (48-57 per cent after
subsidy)
.
2. 88 per cent of subsidy went to cover shipboard
labor costs.
3. 60-75 per cent of the cost of transporting cargo
by ship was expended in port, with cargo handling amounting
to 37-53 per cent of costs to the operator after subsidy.
The data indicated not only a need but a dichotomy of
interest differentiating government and operator outlooks
towards the ultimate replacement of these ships. The
Government which was spending 88 per cent of its subsidy
dollar towards crew costs tended to emphasize crew reduction
through development of shipboard automation. This viewpoint
was further emphasized by the national defense emphasis on
higher ship speeds which as will be seen further increased
crew sizes. To the operator however, looking at out of
pocket costs after subsidy, the costs related to in port time
and cargo handling were of primary importance. Also in con-
sidering ship replacement the operator was faced with a
marked increase in capital expenses. Whereas the WW II C2's
had been purchased under the 1946 Ship Sales Act for about
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$1 million, a new ship of similar capability would cost the
operator four times as much even with subsidy. The increased
annual depreciation and insurance expense (10-15 per cent
compared to the 3-5 per cent for a war built ship) for such
an outlay was estimated to be more than the then current
average net income of the typical C2 . Overall the operator
needed a transportation system with greater productivity in
order to earn a reasonable profit.
The resultant replacement program was to develop a
modern high speed breakbulk cargo liner fleet. By 1964 the
subsidized fleet had four times as many 20 knot cargo liners
as the rest of the world combined and of the 47 such vessels
under construction worldwide, 3 5 were for the subsidized
2
. .
operators. The cost of these vessels to the subsidized
operator have averaged from $5 to $9 million. In general
the cost increase of replacement vessels over prewar costs
have exceeded the increase in the general U. S. shipbuilding
index. The major cost factors in this difference are









The contract plans and detail specifications for
replacement vessels are developed by naval architect firms
to suit the owners desires and requirements. They are used
to obtain bids and closely control construction after con-
tract award. The plans and specifications are not tailored
to the construction methods in any one yard and the ship-
builder is narrowly restricted in construction practice. One
analysis of this area showed a marked dissimilarity between
two type ships of the specifications of components, materials
and systems designed to perform the same function. A necessary
result of this practice has been the proliferation of individ-
ualized ship designs, component specifications, and the limit-
ing of contract awards to generally 3 to 4 ships. In contrast
to this procedure, designs and specifications for unsubsidized
ships are generally developed in direct negotiations between
the owner and the shipbuilder. The developed specifications
are less complicated and incorporate the techniques and
experience of the shipyard.
Another cost factor related to plans and specifications
is the duplication of inspection and regulatory agencies
involved in their review and approval. These are American
Bureau of Shipping, Coast Guard, MARAD, and the Public Health
Service. There is much duplication between the efforts of
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these agencies and it extends over into the inspection of
construction as well.
The second major cost factor are the design require-
ments basically established by MARAD. The major elements in
2 3
this area are; '
1. Ship speed - MARAD has required subsidized ships
to have a speed of 18 knots for shorter runs and 20 knots
for longer runs. The usual solution to this requirement has
been to increase ship size as well as power (finer hull form
and additional length being required for more efficient
powering) . The result is to increase price by 15 per cent
over a two knot slower ship. MARAD has considered the cost
of this approach justified as high speed ships appear to
attract cargo and offer a greater assurance of a competitive
economic life. Conversely operators have contended that in
some trades the minimum speed requirements ignore operating
conditions of specific trade routes such as optimum sailing
schedules, route distances, and port delays which negate the
L. C. Hoffman and C. C. Tangerini, "Reducing Costs
of American Ships," Society of Naval Architects and Marine





W. J. Dorman and J. J. Henry, "U. S. Cargo Ship Cost
Considerations," Society of Naval Architect and Marine
Engineers Transactions , LXIX (1961), 602-607.
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speed advantage. Also increased size and power not only
effect first costs but result in greater crew sizes, and
increased maintenance costs. Professor Harry Benford an
authority on the economic problems of merchant ship design
and operation observed;
In most trades the high speed ships are basically
inefficient and, as competition forces other countries
to follow our lead, we shall all be required to either
raise freight rates or go broke.
2. Power margin - A related factor is MARAD'S
requirement for a 25 per cent additional shaft horsepower
margin over that required for design at full load. (Until
1961 there was an additional 10 per cent power margin for
establishing the certified rating of the plant.) The margin
used in many foreign ships is 15 per cent and that figure




Cargo handling - Other than to require a minimum
boom lift capacity (which some operators objected to as too
high) little was done by MARAD to encourage designs which
would reduce the significant cargo handling costs. There
were numerous industry criticisms of this fact but probably
the most telling is the following admission by the MARAD
1
. .Harry Benford, Discussion on Hoffman, "Reducing
Costs of American Ships," 541.
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Chief Office of Construction and the Assistant Chief,
Division of Ship Design:
It is admitted the concept of most of our present cargo-
handling arrangements is too deeply bound by tradition
and technical progress has been disappointing. -*-
4. Miscellaneous - Other factors reported as increas-
ing first or operating costs of subsidized construction over
unsubsidized or foreign ships include, MARAD subdivision and
damage stability requirements, national defense features,
and MARAD shock resistance design criteria.
5. Crew size - Prominent factors in operator/union
crew size negotiations are gross tonnage and horsepower.
Since the trend for new construction was an increase in both
areas crew sizes also increased. Whereas C2 cargo ships had
crews of 47 some new designs had crews of 55. Since the
Government bore the major share of these costs MARAD research
and development was directed towards automation and the
reduction of maintenance.
The resulting breakbulk liner fleet while enhancing
the military auxiliary role of the merchant marine was not
sufficiently productive to be profitable. Cargo handling
costs continued to rise at about 6 per cent per year between
Hoffmann, "Reducing Costs of American Ships," 529.
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1960 and 1966 . The speed advantage which for a 20 knot ship
in the North Atlantic Trade made only a 32 hour difference in
total transit time, including port time, over a 16% knot ship
was generally not realized. Port loading and unloading delays
increased and overall delivery times were little better for
2the high speed ships. In 1967 MARAD voyage data for the 14
subsidized lines indicated approximately 47 per cent of
3
voyage days were spent in port. The increasing ODS necessary
to support this fleet acted, as a brake on the increasing
appropriations necessary to continue the replacement program.
As shown in Table 4 after a steady increase from 1954 to 1962,
CDS expenditures dropped significantly to an annual rate of
less than 50 per cent of ODS.
Returning to the analysis which started this section,
MacMillan and Westfall prepared an economic comparison of
alternative fleets of 10,000 ton cargo capacity ships
(basically C4 types) designed to provide weekly service on
an assumed 8,000 mile round voyage trade route as a means to
Barker, U. S. Merchant Marine in National Perspective ,
p. 23.
2
Edward V. Lewis, "Research Toward More Efficient
Transportation By Sea, " Society of Naval Architects and Marine
Engineers Transactions , LXIX (1961), 135-137.
p. 26.
3Barker, U. S. Merchant Marine in National Perspective ,
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illustrate the productivity possibilities of differing
replacement vessel designs. Partial results are summarized
in Table 15. While absolute cost and profitability figures
are open to question it is the relative magnitudes between
choices which are significant.
1. The discussion heretofore has discussed the
differing government and operator view points concerning
speed for conventional ships. Columns (1), (2), and (3) show
that a fleet of 20 knot conventional ships results in a 38 to
48 per cent reduction in the owner's return on investment
after subsidy (depending on whether semi-automated or not)
when compared with a 15 knot fleet. Of course if the higher
speed ships attract more cargo the 15 knot fleet advantage
would not be as great. As we have seen, however, the full
speed potential of 20 knot ships has not been realized. The
Government however can reduce its operating subsidy by 22
per cent and still get the higher speed it desires by
requiring a 20 knot semi-automated fleet. Notice the Govern-
ment receives no overall subsidy cost savings per ton carried
because of the higher CDS costs, but it does meet the stated
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2. A more significant comparison however is that
under similar basic conditions the transportation cost for
subsidized containerships are substantially lower (Columns
(4) and (5)) than for conventional ships. Because container
transport is capital intensive there are economies of scale
not realizable by the breakbulk operator. Cargo handling as
a per cent of annual fleet costs is cut in half. Since
there are fewer vessels in the fleet there are savings to
the Government in both operating and construction subsidies.
3. Of greatest importance to the commercial viability
of the U. S. flag merchant marine is the possibility for
profitable unsubsidized container fleet operation summarized
in column (6) . Predicted profitability is four times that
for a subsidized breakbulk fleet.
In spite of this study, and others, the containeriza-
tion break through came not from MARAD and the subsidized
operators, but from "... two independent sources, one a
trucker turned shipper and the other a nonsubsidized steamship
company." (It was not until 1968 that the subsidized
replacement program included a new construction container ship.
)
Also the predictions of significant productivity increases and
James J. Henry and Henry J. Karsch, "Containerships,"
Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers Transactions ,




unsubsidized operation for containerization have come true,
as well as those for only marginal improvements with high
speed liners. Examples of this are;
1. From 1965 data for subsidized costs of cargo
vessels by type of vessel it is possible to calculate an
average ODS per voyage day for each type. The carrying
capacity of each type vessel can be characterized by its
annual lift capacity. Barker has done this for each type in
terms of a standardized unit - the General Purpose Ship (GPS)
Utilizing the data from these two sources the voyage day ODS
per GPS can be calculated as a measure of relative producti-
vity of each ship in terms of ODS expenditures.
Vessel ODS/voyage day GPS equivalent OPS/GPS
C2 $1380 0.559 $2470
C4 (New) $1930 0.841 $2295
The C4 vessel is only 7 per cent more efficient in these
terms than is the C2 vessel.
2. In 1967 the return on investment for the two U. S.
flag unsubsidized container operators were 9.6 and 20.5 per
cent - a higher rate of return than for any other U. S.
2
Ernst, Economic and Financial Data
, pp. 53-54.
2





operator. The latter figure was for Sea Land, the only all-
container operator.
3. A 1968 study showed a loss of significance of
operating and construction-differential subsidies similar to
that in columns (4) , (5) and (6) of Table 15 because a
containership can generate about five times as much annual
revenue as a C4 breakbulk ship for the same annual ODS
expenditure. In a break-even analysis for a 25 knot, 1200
container capacity ship the study predicted the following
breakeven rates in cents per cubic foot capacity for various
percentages of cubic utilization:
Trip Voyage Breakeven Rate (cents/cu. ft
.
)





Since the prevailing average North Atlantic freight rate was
then 78 cents per cu. ft. (equivalent to $3 2 per long ton)
Kenneth A. Meyers, "How Important Will Subsidy Be in
the Future," Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers






an unsubsidized containership could operate profitably at
the 65 per cent average utilization rate for U. S. liners.
The conventional ships of columns (1) to (3) of Table 15
could not make any profit at the $32 per long ton rate.
These predictions are further borne out by the fact that in
1970 both United States Lines and American Export Isbrandtsen
took 16 container ships off subsidy, mostly in the North
Atlantic trade.
Non-Liners
As stated previously this fleet is antiquated and
heavily dependent upon government preference cargoes with
their higher rates. Aside from several owned or under long
term charter to industrial firms for the import of ores and
other industrial raw materials, most of the fleet is engaged
in single voyage or short term contract carriage. While
non-liner cargoes in U. S. foreign trade have increased from
116 to 207 million long tons in the period 1956 to 1969, the
U. S. flag share has decreased from 16 to 4 million long
tons. In 1969 the U. S. flag's share was only 2.1 per cent
of the non-liner's total. Currently better than 90 per cent
of this tonnage is in bulk cargoes and the U. S. failure to




carry a greater share is a direct result of its lack of a
modern bulk cargo fleet.
Foreign fleets consist of 14-16 knot bulk carriers
averaging 25-60,000 DWT. Our non-liner fleet consists
primarily of WW II vessels, some converted, of less than
15000 DWT and only one of which was built as a bulk
carrier. A measure of the inefficiency of the U. S. flag
fleet is a comparison of the unit cost of transportation
for the U. S. vessels and modern foreign bulk carriers,
Table 16. Of interest is the proposed 16 knot, 36-38,000
DWT U. S. bulk carrier. It can operate for % the cost of
our most efficient bulk conversion, when built with 50 per
cent construction subsidy. A 1965 study for MARAD showed
that 30 of these ships could replace about 106 marginal ships
and the resultant bulk fleet would have no vessels less
efficient than the 23,500 DWT converted T2 . Also it would
be profitable to operate the new ships at 2 5 per cent below
the preference cargo rates-that is at an intermediate rate
which is approximately the arithmetic mean of the U. S. and
foreign rates.
MARAD, Annual Report FY 1970 , pp. 4 and 27.
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U. S. CENTS PER






Converted T2 16,000 82
Converted T2 23,500 62
Proposed U. S. Bulk 36-38,000 31b
Foreign Bulk 23,000 24
Foreign Bulk 33,000 19
Foreign Bulk 42,000 16
Source: D. M. Mack-Forlist and R. Hettena, "An Economic
Feasibility Study of United States Bulk Carriers," Marine
Technology
, III, No. 2 (1966), 145-146.
Cost data are as of September, 1965 and include
both operating and capital costs.




The possibility of a modern bulk fleet provided an
alternative to the average $92 million per year (Table 10)
expended in preference rates, mostly for balk cargoes. The
new fleet could be financed from the 25 per cent rate reduc-
tion ($23 million) . The cost of each new ship would range
between $8.08 million and $10.7 million depending upon
whether they were built at least 10 ships to a builder under
a stable program, or in one ship contracts. Assuming the
ships were let in groups of 5, to 6 different builders
during the course of this program, the cost per ship would
be $9.06 million of which the government subsidy would be
$4.53 million. One such contract could have been let a year
for 6 years at an increase of $22.7 million in construction
subsidy. Each vessel would repay its construction subsidy
cost in preference rate savings in 6 years. The ships could
operate in one of three modes
;
1. Preference cargoes at a 25 per cent lower rate.
2. Half the time at U. S. rates with preference
cargoes and the remaining time in the open market against
foreign competition.
3. Under an operating differential subsidy which
provides equivalent support.
1
Ibid. , 145 and 151.
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Domestic and Foreign Trade Tanker Fleet
The U. S. flag tanker fleet has been fairly stable in
size over recent years. As of June 30, 1970 it consisted of
249 active ships of 6.8 million DWT. There were 175 in
domestic trade, 29 foreign, and 42 under government charter.
The fleet is for the most part owned and operated by
financially secure oil companies in their own service.
The domestic segment of the fleet is protected by
cabotage and has no foreign competition. It has been the
primary source of unsubsidized ship construction in U. S.
shipyards. The need for ships is based solely upon the
economic factors of oil demand and the relative costs of
water transport versus other transport means. This demand
is expected to increase markedly with the shipment of Alaskan
oil to East and West coast ports. A Commerce Department
report of October, 1971 on the economic effects of the Trans-
Alaska pipeline system projects a requirement for 41 tankers
by 1980 of which 33 will be new construction in the 120-250,000
2DWT class. There are currently two - 225,000 DWT U. S. flag
3
tankers under construction in a U. S. yard; the largest
MARAD, Annual Report FY 1970
, p. 61.
2
Shipyard Weekly No. 44 (Nov. 4, 1971)
.
3




since the 108,000 DWT Manhattan was built in
1962.
The ships of the foreign trade segment are older
and smaller than their foreign competition. They cannot
compete with the charter rates offered by foreign super
tankers. The foreign trade segment carried only 3.6 per
cent of our foreign trade tanker tonnage in 1969 compared
to 20.6 per cent in 1956. The fleet has depended on
government grain cargoes and military petroleum shipments
to stay in operation.
Prospects for replacement and expansion of this
fleet in the near future are brighter because of three
factors. First it is now eligible for both CDS and ODS
under the Merchant Marine Act 1970. It is expected that
these subsidies will not only aid in replacing the present
fleet, but also older ships of the EUSC Fleet in U. S.
foreign trade. Second there are projections for large
imports of liquified natural gas (LNG) into East Coast ports,
One present subsidy application involves 6 - 90,000 DWT LNG
carriers estimated to cost in excess of $70 million each.
Estimates of the eventual requirement for LNG ships to carry
U. S. imports vary from 60 to 80 ships of 13 0-170,000 DWT
Ibid
. , p. 27.
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costing $75-90 million each if built in U. S. yards. It is
questionable as to how many of these ships would be built in
U. S. yards as the expensive vessels might require a dispro-
portionate share of future subsidy funds. There is a
counterbalance, however, in that the U. S. /foreign cost
differential to build LNG carriers with their cryogenic
storage systems is expected to be less than for other type
vessels. Third, with increasing U. S. dependence upon oil
imports there is concern that unless a significant share is
carried in U. S. ships the flow could be severed. A bill
(H.R. 12324) has been introduced by Chairman Garmatz of the
House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee to require
that 50 per cent of all oil imports be carried in U. S. flag
2
ships because "... national security demands it."
Introduced in December, 1971 this bill was in hearings in
February, 1972. The fact that this legislation is being
considered so soon after passage of the 1970 Act is further
evidence that the Government has yet to set clear national
defense objectives for its merchant marine policy.
Shipyard Weekly No. 42 (Oct. 21, 1971)
.
2
Shipyard Weekly No. 51 (Dec. 23, 1971).
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Domestic Dry Cargo Fleet
This fleet, protected by cabotage, has also been
1
fairly stable at 70 vessels. The major subsidy benefits
have been the Ship Exchange Program, which has provided a
source for conversion to containerships, and FSMI . Its size
is dependent upon cargo demand in competition with other
transport. The noncontiguous trade fleet represents 2/3 of
the domestic fleet and contains the few ships built since
World War II. Replacement of the domestic dry cargo fleet
should remain a minor factor in U. S. flag construction. Its
present ships will probably be replaced slowly with new
construction containerships and breakbulk/partial container
types obtained from the subsidized fleet.
Summary
The largest segment of the merchant marine is the
foreign trade dry cargo fleet, and it is this fleet which
has been most effected by government subsidies. The fleet
is composed of subsidized and unsubsidized liners, and non-
liners .
The subsidized liner fleet has been the sole recipient
of government operating and construction-differential




subsidies. The 194 ship subsidized liner replacement
program has been the major source of merchant construction
in U. S. shipyards, and has created the only modern ships in
the U. S. flag foreign trade merchant marine. The program
however has been far from an unqualified success. In its
early designs the program failed to recognize the need to
significantly reduce cargo handling costs. The modern
subsidized breakbulk liner fleet which it developed required
increasingly greater operating differential subsidy to
support it. Initially the increases served to limit funds
available for construction subsidy until a balance was
achieved where over 2/3 of the Government funds went to the
operating subsidy. Not only did this policy limit the
amount of subsidized construction and the size of the fleet
which could be supported, but it failed to foster the early
development of containerization technology and associated
ship designs needed to create a profitable unsubsidized fleet
The foreign trade non-liner fleet is antiquated and
heavily dependent upon government preference cargoes for
employment. While bulk cargoes amount to better than 90 per
cent of total non-liner foreign trade tonnage, and statutory
authority has been available since 1952 to subsidize construc-
tion of modern, efficient bulk carriers none have been built.
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Funds which could have been used to build these ships have
been expended through cargo preference rates to maintain a
non-liner fleet which is commercially noncompetitive and of
marginal national defense value.

V. THE MAJOR PRIVATE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
Identification of the Industry
The major private shipbuilding industry presently
consists of 13 companies operating 17 shipyards capable of
constructing merchant vessels 475 feet in length by 68 feet
in beam and larger. Nine of these companies plus the
defunct New York Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation are
or have constructed ships under the subsidized replacement
program in 13 different shipyards. The shipyards presently
in business are identified in Table 17. Since 1960 most of
the independent shipyards have become part of large multi-
division corporations or conglomerates. This has resulted
in a period of management instability that has included both
internal management changes and the movement of top executives
between shipyards. Only Alabama Drydock & Shipbuilding
Company and Todd are independent, and of these only Todd has
participated in subsidized construction.
All the shipyards are specialized toward the construc-
tion and reconditioning of ships and while they have some
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not always able to be competitive with specialized heavy
industry firms. Beyond this the shipyards vary widely in
size, financial capability, facility investment and
modernization, and market participation. The largest, Newport
News Shipbuilding & Drydock Company, has an asset value of
over $175 million, employs about 20,000, has invested $69 mil-
lion in new facilities in the 10 year period subsequent to
1960, has experienced a .75 per cent facility utilization over
the past several years, and in 1970 had a stable workload
backlog through 1973. One of the smallest, Bath Iron Works,
has assets of about $20 million and has invested about $4
million in new facilities since 1965. In 1970 it was
experiencing a 25 per cent utilization of facilities with a
declining employment of 2,800 and no backlog of new construc-
tion orders.
All except one of the shipyards were either in existence
before World War II or were created during the war. The Litton
Ship Systems Yard is a $130 million investment completed in
1971. Termed a "ship manufacturing facility" by Litton, it
is designed for series production of ships through fabrication
of preoutfitted modules of increasing size. The ship is
Seapower Subcommittee, Shipyards




assembled by integration of the final modules weighing 6,000
to 8,000 tons. The Seatrain yard was recently formed, but
utilizes the facilities of the closed New York Naval
Shipyard.
The financial condition of the shipyards and the
profitability of their subsidized construction business is
difficult to determine. The majority of the yards are not
independent and are not identified separately in corporate
financial statements sufficiently to analyze the results of
their separate business operations. The one independent
shipyard, Todd, which has participated in MARAD subsidized
construction, has not done so since an award in 1959. For
these reasons dependence must be placed upon the statements
of industry spokesmen and the records of Congressional
hearings. Unfortunately while the latter have elicited the
financial experience of a number of shipyards on MARAD
contracts they have for the most part been deleted from
hearing records as privileged information.
There are other factors which differentiate the ship-
yards and have had an effect on their ability to compete and
prosper. Some comprise the major industry in an area and
others only a minor segment; some have been able to maintain
Ibid
.
, statement Ellis B. Gardner, Jr. pp. 10807-808
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a relatively stable volume of work and therefore a cadre of
skilled personnel while others have not; material and labor
costs vary between yards and areas; and finally the shipyards
participate in varying mixes of construction, reconstruction
and repair for Navy, MARAD, or private interests.
Industry Activity
The level and type of activity engaged in by the major
private shipyards can be' stated as the annual dollar or
tonnage value of contract awards, ships building or an order,
or deliveries - or as an employment breakdown by types of
activity. The latter approach is used here as it presents
the clearest picture of the relative levels of effort
differentiated by type (repair or construction) and by
customer (Navy, MARAD subsidy, or private ship owner) during
the period. Table 18 is a compilation of average employment
figures for one month of each year from just prior to the
start of the subsidized replacement program in 1956 to 1970,
with MARAD estimates for projected private and subsidized
merchant ship construction through 1978.
U. S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration,
Relative Cost of Shipbuilding (Washington, D. C. : Government
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During the period total production employment has
doubled with construction being the largest source of
employment, 72-85 per cent. The initial and largest buildup
in 1956-1957 was primarily due to the influx of private
construction orders. In July, 1957 MARAD employment tripled
with the start of the subsidized replacement program. Both
in 1957 and 1958 merchant ships accounted for 66 per cent of
construction employment- Then a major change occurred in
1959 with the reversal of the Navy versus merchant ship share
of construction employment. For every year since 1959 Navy
construction has been the dominant source of employment and
the primary stabilizing influence in the industry. It has
averaged 48 to 58 per cent of all production employment and
61 to 73 per cent of construction employment. Of the 13
shipyards which have participated in the subsidized construc-
tion program all but two (Sun and Seatrain) have also built
naval ships
.
Overall work force employment and facility utilization
have been below that required for maximum efficiency. In
1970 it was estimated that present facilities were employing
a work force on the range of 5 5-60 per cent of optimum numbers
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and that facility utilization was approximately 60-65 per
cent of facility capacity.
Ship repair employment has also doubled during the
period. The work has been split between Navy and private
merchant ships with direct MARAD work a negligible factor.
Only in 1967 did MARAD repair work amount to more than a few
hundred employees, and this was related to the reactivation
2
of ships from the reserve fleet. Much of the private repair
work is a result of the requirement of the Merchant Marine
Act, 1936 that subsidized vessels must be repaired in the
U. S. and until the 1970 Act subsidized operators received
3
a subsidy of about 3 2 per cent of the cost of such work.
Also repair work accomplished overseas on U. S. flag ships
is subject to customs tax upon return of ship to the U. S.
Thus for subsidized ships the cost advantages of foreign
repairs are less than might be expected. Repair work will
not be considered further and the remainder of this chapter
will concentrate on merchant ship construction since this is




Ibid . , p. 10655.
3




Merchant Ship Construction i.
In analyzing merchant ship construction use will be
made of Tables 17, 18, and 19, but first there are inconsis-
tencies about the latter which should be understood. All
data related to subsidized construction are accurate for the
major private shipyards. Data for other types of employment
however are not explicitly limited to the major yards and
include some construction by smaller or Great Lakes yards.
The effect of the other yards is small. For instance of the
203 merchant ships 1000 G.T. and over delivered by all
private yards between 1961 and 1970 (Table 19) , 192 were
ships 5000 G.T. and over delivered by the major private
shipyards (Table 17). (Most of the error is in the U. S.
Flag No. Subsidy Account.) Table 19 therefore will be used
as a measure of overall major private yard employment during
the period.
Total annual awards, construction backlog, and
deliveries have varied widely as also has merchant ship
construction employment. The period started with a tripling
of production workers engaged in merchant ship construction
to a high of 31,000 in 1957 and subsequently decreased to a
level in 1960 and later of about \ that amount. The cause
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combined, most of which were for foreign registry or
unsubsidized U. S. flag. The closing of the Suez Canal
created a large tanker demand at the time and U. S. yards
were able to obtain foreign orders because they offered
faster deliveries than some over
-booked foreign yards. since
that event U. S. shipyards have not competed for foreign
construction.
Private project employment decreased to a low of 2,900
employees in 1962-1963 and subsequently increased substantially
to a 9-11,000 level in 1969-1970. Over 100 of the 124
unsubsidized D. S. flag ships delivered between 1956 and 1970
were tankers. (The difference is primarily small ships built
in other than the major yards.) The cyclical variation of
production employment and deliveries has been related to the
replacement policies of the domestic tanker fleet. The initial
tanker construction was to meet increased fuel carrying demand,
while the recent increase has a two-fold purpose of replacing
the 70 odd-ships which are over 20 years old and to increase
efficiency and capacity with larger ships. 1 Although labeled
as "no subsidy" practically all ships were built with govern-
ment mortgage insurance, whether or not there was government




mortgage aid is believed of little importance because cabotage
laws require the domestic fleet to be built in U. S. shipyards,
and construction has been on the basis of cargo demand not
speculation of profitable employment.
Government construction account includes ships built
for the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and other government
construction under TITLE VII of the 1936 Act. As discussed
in Chapter III, TITLE VII has not been used for merchant ship
construction since the 1951 Mariner program, the last of.
which were delivered in 1955. Government account construction
has been a negligible factor.
The MARAD subsidized ship replacement program has had
a stabilizing influence on the industry. Between 1958 and
1966, 155 of the 188 merchant ship construction awards were
for subsidized ships. Were it not for these awards the
industry order books for the years 1961 through 1967 would
have averaged only 12.6 merchants on order or building. Yet
the subsidized program has not been a very stable source of
employment itself. Changes of greater than 30 per cent in
employment level have occurred in 7 of the 12 inter-year
intervals between 1958 and 1970, and of 50 per cent or more
in 4 of the 12 years.
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Changes in program levels which cause shifts between
the employment categories of Table 18 without decreasing
total employment are very disruptive. An example is 1967,
which Table 18 indicates as the third year of a four year
upswing in total employment, while suffering a one year drop
in construction employment. In that year the industry layoff
rate was 5.4 per cent as against 2.2 per cent for the entire
transportation equipment industry (of which shipbuilding is
a part) and simultaneously there were shipyard complaints of
lack of skilled manpower. An industry experiencing skill
shortages would be expected to have a lower than average
layoff rate. Apparently the yards experiencing shortages
are not those laying men off and the effects of changing
private/subsidized/Navy construction and repair work mixes
cause instabilities not apparent in gross industry figures.
Before proceeding to a more detailed analysis of the
subsidized construction programs* effect on the individual
major shipyards it is well to consider its average annual
effect in terms of awards, order book, and deliveries. Rather
than calculating an average for 1956-1970 for all factors it
is more meaningful to consider each from when it felt the
Mordechai Lando, Measuring Productivity in the U. S
Shipbuilding Industry (Arlington, Va . : Center for Naval
Analyses, 1969), p. 8.
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subsidized program effect. Awards did not reach an
appreciable level until 1958, and it took 2 and 3 years




Total Merchant 18.1 51.6 20.6
Subsidized 14.1 37.7 13.6
Subsidized Construction Program
Criticisms of the subsidized construction program
from the merchant shipbuilding industry have been numerous.
Basic to all criticism is the charge that the lack of a long
term funded commitment by the Government and shipping industry
to construct standardized ships is at the root of most industry
problems. They charge that the procurement environment has
produced extreme variations in (1) shipyard workload, (2)
level of employment, (3) composition of the work force, (4)
level and composition of the order book, and that these have
in turn resulted in low profitability, and the lack of
stability necessary to attract investments and make major
capital commitments.
Seapower Subcommittee, Shipyards , Statement of E. M
Hood, President Shipbuilders Council of America, p. 10686.
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Evaluation of the effects of the subsidy program
must be done on both an industry and an individual shipyard
basis. Industry workload, employment, work force composi-
tion, and order book have already been discussed. Another
facet of employment and work force composition is the
inability of the industry since 1966 to attract skilled
manpower in the pipefitter, welder, shipfitter, machinist
and electrical crafts. Younger men are enticed either into
the higher paying construction trades or more stable
industries. A 1970 study showed that the median age for
these critical crafts in an East and Gulf Coast yard were 40
and 44.6 respectively. This would indicate the need for the
replacement of a substantial number in the critical crafts
in the next 10 years even if the work force does not grow.
Multiple ship awards of standardized ships are necessary
to realize the learning factor benefits of series production of
one design in one yard. Shipbuilding learning factors have
been estimated to range from 0.87 to 0.96 and generally runs
2
of 10 or more ships have been considered optimum. An example
1Ibid
. , p. 10665.
2
A thorough research into cost variation due to delivery
intervals and multiple quantities is contained in James K.
McNeal, "A Method for Comparing Costs of Ships Due to Alterna-
tive Delivery Intervals and Multiple Quantities," Society of




of this effect is the construction award of 11 LASH ships.
The ships are reported to have each cost 78 per cent of their
cost if built one at a time. If 3 ships only had been awarded
the cost of each was estimated at 90 per cent of the one ship
cost.
Considering the program on the basis of standardization
there have been contract awards for 190 ships of 38 different
ship designs in the fiscal year period 1958 to 1971 or an
average of 5 ships per design. On the 38, only 3 designs
totalling 51 ships have consisted of 10 or more ships, and
of these only 2 designs of 30 ships have been awarded all to
one yard. In both cases the awards went to Avondale; 12
C4S66a (4 in FY 1968 and 8 in FY 1963) and 18 C8S81b (LASH)
(11 in FY 1968 and 7 in FY 1971). 2
In addition to designs, the construction program can
be considered in terms of basic types, where all designs that
are variations of a type (e.g. C3S37a, C3S37b, etc.) are
considered as one. Type ships are really not standard
because although the hull design is similar there are often
significant differences in machinery, hold arrangements,
Meyers, "How Important Will Subsidy Be in the Future,"
368.
2
This and subsequent detail data on contract awards and
ship designs is compiled from MARAD data of subsidized con-
struction contract awards for FY 1958 through 1971.
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quarters, and cargo handling gear. Even minor differences
in these areas can increase engineering costs and result in
a loss of yard efficiency through loss of the gain in
productivity associated with the learning curve. Minor
changes in engineroom arrangement or power plant can require
about 150 plans to be redrawn at a cost of about $3,000 per
plan. Basic quarters configuration, consisting of about 100
drawings, is another high cost area with the potential for
large learning gains which can be lost through minor changes.
There were 23 basic types awarded in the program for an
average of 8 ships per type. Of the 23 only 6 types
totalling 92 ships have consisted of 10 or more ships and
of these only 3 types involved cases where a shipyard
received awards amounting to 10 or more ships of the type.
These cases include the two designs built by Avondale and 3
awards to Bethlehem Steel, Sparrows Point for 12 ships of
the C3S37 type (4 C3S37a in FY 1959 and 4 each of "b" and
"c" variations in FY 1961)
.
Thus even when including the loosely defined ship
type there have been only 3 "standard" ships for which one
yard has been awarded 10 or more ships. Only in the FY 1968
Charles Zeien, "Ship Procurement-Isn ' t There a Better
Way?," Marine Technology , IV, No. 3 (1967), 270.
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award of LASH ships to Avondale did the yard receive the
commitment to build 10 or more ships in one contract. In
the other two cases the initial awards were for 4 ships
followed by more in a later fiscal year. The latter were
not true multi-year awards. The initial bids were developed
for 4 ships only and the yards received no commitments for
follow-on construction. Therefore the increased application
of engineering effort and capital investment and concurrent
decrease in per vessel cost expected of a 10 or more ship
contract did not materialize.
Referring to Table 17 the subsidized construction
program can be viewed in the context of shipyard participa-
tion. First, there were 12 shipyards which delivered ships
in the 1961-1970 period, and while only Bath did not
participate prior to 1966, the number delivering ships in
the 1966-1970 period has reduced to 7. The number of total
and subsidized ships delivered are, however, almost evenly
divided between the two periods.
Second, if it has been one purpose of the program to
maintain a merchant shipbuilding capability on all coasts,
the West Coast has not participated to the extent of the
other coasts. Annual reports on the relative costs of
shipbuilding on the various coasts, required by the 1936 Act
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have, computed a cost disadvantage for West Coast yards.
They have concluded that this geographical cost differential
is relatively small when compared with shipyard production
efficiency and overhead cost differences, competitive bid
differences, and differences in costs between shipyards on
the same coast. Also the West Coast yards have engaged
recently in naval construction.
Third, there is a differentiation of level of subsidized
effort by shipyards.
1. Three yards (Sun, Ingalls, and Avondale) have par-
ticipated equally in the two periods, each delivered 15 per
cent or more of the total subsidized deliveries, and each
received 80 per cent or more of its merchant ship employment
from the subsidized program. They have built 82 of the 146
subsidized ships delivered. Sun has not constructed naval
ships during the period while Ingalls and Avondale have
divided their work between Navy and merchant. Considering
these shipyards in terms of subsidized ship awards for fiscal
years 1958-1971 only Avondale has bettered the total program
average for ships awarded by design or type. Avondale'
s
averages are 6.7 ships per design and 9.4 ships per type.
Thus while these yards received the major portion of their




merchant ship employment from the subsidized program only one
faired better than the average in obtaining standardization
of employment. When considered on a ship per contract basis
Avondale and Ingalls averaged better than 4 per contract and
Sun only 3 per contract. In all cases a very limited
commitment upon which to amortize engineering costs and capital
investments
.
2. Three yards (Bethlehem Steel Sparrows Point, Newport
News, and National Steel) participated significantly during the
first 5 year period only. In total they have produced 45 of
the subsidized ships. Bethlehem has been the largest builder
of merchant ships in the U. S., most of which have been tankers
Newport News and National Steel have recently participated
heavily in naval construction. The subsidized construction
in these yards is characterized by a heavy concentration
followed by a 4-7 year period without any awards. When awards
are considered by type and design they are below the average,
and on a ships per contract basis are between 2 and 3 . The
President of Newport News has stated before Congress that
their average profitability for government construction during
the years 1965-1969 was only \ that of their other business
(government business during this period involved naval
construction and the construction and delivery of 5 subsidized
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ships.) He also noted that they would need awards of 8-10
ships of a particular design per year to operate profitably.
3. The remaining yards (excepting the two recently
opened yards) make up the final grouping. This grouping is
characterized primarily by the smaller shipyards which have
participated only sporadically in subsidized construction.
To some degree they have been an unstabilizing influence. A
case in point is Bath Iron Works; in testimony before Congress
their President stated that they had a loss on the 3 delivered
merchant ships, which they were willing to take as the cost of
2learning the business. It appears the same philosophy may
have been followed in 1970 bidding when with no other construc-
tion backlog, Bath under bid three other shipyards by 8.5 to
3
25.4 per cent.
Alternative Construction Subsidy Program
Building on the background developed in Chapter IV an
alternative to the subsidized construction program could have
been one which, (1) fostered the development containerships
and thereby reduced the need for ODS, and which (2) subsidized
Seapower Subcommittee, Shipyards





MARAD, Relative Cost of Shipbuilding , p. 33.
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the construction of a bulk carrier fleet. The two aspects
considered separately below both assume the availability of
profitable employment for the ships when built, no increase
in government subsidy expenditures, and would have required
no change in legislation.
1. If commencing in 1962 standardized containerships
were constructed in lieu of breakbulk liners the annual new
construction subsidy expenditure (Table 4) could have been
retained at near its $13 7 million peak while ODS expenditures
decreased as the more productive ships entered service. Total
government subsidy expenditures would not increase. Assuming
a per ship cost of $17.5 million and a 50 per cent subsidy,
161 ships could have been awarded in the fiscal year 1962-
1971 period as opposed to the actual number of 116. The
additional 4.5 ships per year for this period would have been
better than Avondale's average of 4.4 ship awards per year
and more than twice that of any other shipyard. It could
provide full employment for a 50,000 ton steel output per
year shipyard; the size of Bath or National Steel.
2. Commencing in 1966 30 standard bulk carriers
could have been constructed at the rate of 5 per year with
50 per cent subsidy ultimately financed from preference rate
savings. This also would have provided full employment for
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the equivalent of one 50,000 ton per year shipyard commencing
in 1966. 1
Of course if both programs involved multiyear contracts
involving one shipyard each, the commitment would have been
sufficient to underwrite substantial capital improvements and
engineering design costs. The contracts could have been
profitable and the competitive position of the shipyards
enhanced.
Effect of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970
The prospective effects of the 1970 Act on the ship-
building industry can be measured by the answers to 3 questions
1. Will the 3 00 standardized ships actually be con-
structed in the 10 year period ending in fiscal year 1980?
2. Can the shipyards meet the challenge of the
decreasing subsidy limits?
3. What will be the condition of the major U. S. ship-
yards at the end of the 10 year program?
Considering the first question the program is already
behind schedule by at least 2 years. The fiscal year 1972
program was budgeted for 22 ships and was stated to represent
the "second and final year of the initial buildup phase" to




the 30 ship per year program. The fiscal year 1973 program
however is estimated at only 15 ships and is described as
the "third and final year" of the buildup to a 30 ship per
2year program by 1974. The causes of the delay have been
attributed to a sharp decline in the international shipping
market in 1971, a decrease in charter rates, further decline
in U. S. flag cargoes, and the generally poor earnings of
U. S. operators which have discouraged investment capital
3for new ships. In short government funds have been available
but private funds have not, and the program will therefore
include only 49 ships through its first 3 years.
There is however a large backlog of pending construc-
tion subsidy applications and if conditions for investment
improve it would be expected that many will actually result
in construction, but over some extended time period such as
3 to 4 years. In mid 1971 there were 52 applications from
unsubsidized operators including 11 LASH, 31 0B0, and 10
4
tankers, as compared with only 5 pending in mid 1970. In
FY 1972 Budget Appendix , p. 272.
2
FY 1973 Budget Appendix , p. 270.
3
Shipyard Weekly No. 37 (Sept. 16, 1971) and No. 52
(Dec. 30, 1971)
4
MARAD, Annual Report FY 1970 , p. 25.
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addition subsidized operators had replacement commitments
for 35 ships in fiscal years 1972 and 1973, including 5 LASH
and 3 cargo.
To date there is only one standard design in series
production, the LASH ship. Avondale has 18 constructed or on
order and there are applications pending for 17 more. The
LASH system is actually a patented design and not a product
of the new program. It is fairly certain that OBO and tanker
designs will also reach series production of standard ships
but there appears to be resistance from subsidized operators
to acceptance of standard general cargo and containership
designs
.
On the basis of all information it would appear that
the 300 ship goal will probably be met, but not until fiscal
year 1985 for an average construction of 21 ships per year
from 1974 through 1985.
The challenge of meeting the reducing subsidy limits
is effected by a number of factors; (1) the relative variation
of U. S. and foreign shipbuilding costs, (2) the construction
mix and attainability of series production of standard designs
engineered for efficient production, and (3) the commitment of
"U. S. Shipbuilding Outlook," Marine Engineering/Log ,




capital investments necessary to reduce labor costs and
modernize the industry.
On the first item it must be remembered that the
construction subsidy is the relative difference between
U. S. and foreign shipbuilding costs. In recent years
foreign costs have risen more rapidly than in the U. S.
This has been a major factor in the industry's ability to
reduce the overall subsidy rate by 8 per cent between 1969
and 1971. Speaking of the effect of rising foreign prices
on CDS E. M. Hood of the Shipbuilder's Council of America
has stated, "It is in this sense that the declining scale . . .
will be met.
"
The problem of standard designs has been discussed
above. As of now the most pressing problems are the lack of
shipping industry acceptance of the standard general cargo
and containership designs that have been developed under
MARAD sponsorship, and the fact that only one ship design
2
has gone into series production.
On the last account productivity and capital investment
in the shipbuilding industry are on the rise. A recent study
Shipyard Weekly , No. 49 (Dec. 3, 1970).
2
For a discussion of the designs refer to Ronald K.
Kiss and John J. Garvey, "CMX Designs-Merchant Ships for the




of a number of productivity indexes for the period 1958 to
1966 showed that productivity for the entire shipbuilding
and repair industry increased over 10 per cent. The increase
was ascribed to the increased demand for naval ships during
the period since the productivity in the Navy related
construction and repair increased by about 17 per cent. New
technology was not considered a factor because the capital
investments in 1966 were only 2.3 per cent of the value of
work done, approximately the same as the 1958 level. Since
then capital investment has been increasing steadily. In
1969 and 1970 it was estimated at $100 million, up from $53
million in 1966, and the capital investment to value of work
done ratio was also up to 3.7 per cent. The change is even
more dramatic when considered on a capital expenditure per
2production worker basis;
1958 - $382 1968 - $649
1966 - $462 1970 - $930
It is apparent that, while the shipbuilding industry is
willing to increase capital expenditures and improve produc-
tivity, its ability to meet the declining subsidies is tied
Lando, Productivity in the Shipbuilding Industry , pp.
3-7.
2
Based on 1958-1968 data and 1969-1970 estimates in
Dept. of Commerce, Industrial Outlook 1971 , pp. 380-82; and




primarily to the actions of foreign shipyards and the
shipping industries commitment to series production of
standard ship designs.
In considering the impact of the program on the
industry, both naval and merchant ship workload must be
considered. Naval construction dollars are expected to
remain high, but there will be a contraction in the number
of the major private shipyards participating. The reasons
for this are three fold; (1) the ships will be more
sophisticated and expensive therefore fewer will be built;
(2) nuclear ship construction will increase concentrating
work in the nuclear qualified major private shipyards (There
are presently two, Newport News and Ingalls, the latter
being qualified for submarine nuclear construction only.);
(3) increased use of series production through multiyear
contract awards such as the recent LST 1179, DE 1078, DD 963,
and LHA programs will concentrate non-nuclear work in fewer
shipyards
.
Series production through multiyear awards of sub-
sidized construction will also concentrate major merchant
ship construction in fewer yards, which will have invested
heavily in capital improvements. Indications of this are
studies by MARAD and two MARAD sponsored shipyards which
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estimate an investment of $125 million in a new production
facility plus series production are required to reduce CDS
to the 3 5 per cent rate and still return a reasonable profit
on investment. The optimum steel output for such a yard
would be 150,000 tons per year, the equivalent of 15
containerships or 10-70,000 DWT tankers. Thus on the basis
of steel output the optimum yard could produce 1/3 to 1/2 of
the 30 ship- per year MARAD program.
MARAD has estimated that 6 to 8 shipyards will
. . . 2participate in naval and merchant construction in the 1970* s.
More interesting however is a linear programming model of the
effects of two government programs on the U. S. private ship-
building industry in the 1970' s. The key parameters and
results of the simulation for a program solution that
allocated ship orders to yards based on lowest costs is
presented in Table 20. The study also emphasized the impact
of a new shipyard (the Litton Ship Systems Yard) in being
able to build ships at lower costs and predicted full
employment for that yard even under the small program. A
policy of equalizing capacity utilization in all shipyards
Seapower Subcommittee, Shipyards
, pp. 10661-662 and
10956.
2
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Source: William F. Beazer, et al . , An Economic Analysis of
the U. S. Shipbuilding Industry for the 1970 's





was also investigated and found to yield use rates for the
small program of 40 per cent or less. The equalization
program did have the benefit of encouraging modernization
in more shipyards, but at an additional 10 per cent cost
per year to the ship buyers.
Three years have passed since the study was made and
its predictions are not valid for the early 1970* s, but they
do provide insight as to what the industry may be in the
early 1980' s. The small program is less than that expected
over the next decade. Also its cost minimizing solution
results in several merchant ship construction runs of over
3 ships, which is probably more than can be expected. Since
both these factors tend to minimize the number of shipyards
employed, 5 is considered the lower limit on the shipyards
that will be engaged in construction in the early 1980' s.
Similarly, the large program is greater than that which will
develop because the unsubsidized merchant construction will
probably be 15 vice 25. Therefore it places an upper limit
on the shipyards of 9 to 10. It then" follows that an estimate
of 6 to 8 modernized shipyards, possibly including a new yard
William F. Beazer, et al
. , An Economic Analysis of
the U. S. Shipbuilding Industry for the 1970 '
s
(Arlington,
Va. : Institute for Defense Analyses, 1969), pp. xi-xvi.
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not now in existance, will comprise the major shipbuilding
industry in the early 1980' s.
Summary
The major private shipbuilding industry consists
presently of 17 shipyards of widely differing size, capabil-
ities, resources, and workload mixes. Ship construction is
the primary activity of these shipyards and since 1958 Navy
construction has employed about 67 per cent of the production
force. The subsidized construction program has accounted for
67 per cent of the merchant ship deliveries in the period
1961 to 1970. While it has been larger and more stable than
unsubsidized construction, there still have been a number of
major changes in program level which have had a disruptive
influence on the industry.
When considered on a shipyard by shipyard basis the
subsidy program is shown to be even more unstable. Because
it has encouraged the development of numerous designs
individualized to each owners desires, shipyards havei been
unable to obtain long term contracts for series production
of a single design. The lack of incentives for capital
improvement coupled with the lack of shipyard participation
in the design process so as to engineer ships for efficient
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production are two of the major failings of the subsidized
construction program.
The 1970 Act with its emphasis on multiyear contracts
for the construction of standard designs will provide better
employment for the industry. At the conclusion of the 300
ship program, probably less than \ of the present shipyards
will remain. Those that do will either be new or signifi-
cantly modernized.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The fortunes of the U. S. merchant marine and U. S.
shipbuilding industry have been coupled since the founding
of the nation. First joined by the requirement that a ship
must be constructed in a U. S. shipyard in order to be
eligible for U.'S. registry, they have been subsequently
linked through Federal maritime policy and the system of
subsidy supports which implement the policy.
Because of this linkage it is best to summarize the
answers to the research and subsidiary questions in two
parts. The first part is concerned with questions of joint
import to the merchant marine and the shipbuilding industry.
That is the questions of U. S. policy toward both; the
subsidy programs which provide major support to the ship-
building industry; the evaluation of subsidy programs as a
stimulus to ship replacement; and the expectations for the
effect of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 on these matters.
The second part considers questions related specifically to
the major private shipyards; the identification of the




relative importance of subsidized construction to their total
workload; the characteristics of subsidized construction which
might enhance stability and modernization in the industry; and
the expected effect of the 1970 Act on the industry.
The Merchant Marine and the Shipbuilding Industry
Federal maritime policy, as proclaimed by the Merchant
Marine Act, 1936 and its amendments, states that it is
necessary for reasons of national defense and the development
of foreign and domestic commerce to have a privately owned
U. S. flag merchant marine, composed of the best-equipped and
most suitable ships, constructed and maintained by an efficient
U. S. shipbuilding and repair industry, and manned by citizen
personnel. It is intended to be capable of carrying all
domestic commerce, a substantial portion of our foreign
commerce on essential trade routes, and acting as a naval
auxiliary when needed. The domestic segment of the merchant
marine, already protected from foreign competition by cabotage
laws, receives small direct benefit from the Act. The non-
liner and tanker segments of the foreign trade fleet were
originally excluded from support because they do not provide
regular service on essential trade routes. The primary
recipient of direct government support has been the foreign
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trade liner fleet. The major portion of this fleet receives
direct support through Federal subsidies of daily operations
and ship replacement. The subsidies are designed to equalize
U. S. liner costs with those of a competitive foreign liner.
It is via the latter construction subsidy that the ship-
building industry receives its major support from the Federal
Government. Until the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 there was
no direct Federal construction subsidy to the shipbuilding
industry independent of a liner construction contract.
In 1954, faced with block obsolescence of the World
War II built fleet by 1970, the Government and subsidized
liner operators embarked on a construction program designed
to replace the 3 00 ship fleet by the early 1970 's. The
program, concentrating on high speed breakbulk cargo liners,
failed to meet its goal and through 1970 only 158 ships had
been delivered. The program failed basically on two accounts
First there was no policy declaration defining "substantial
portion" and therefore no effective Federal program to expand
or maintain U. S. liner carryings either on an absolute
tonnage or share of the market basis. U. S. carryings, as
measured by both indices have declined, thus eroding the
financial condition of the subsidized operators and limiting
the ability to meet their replacement commitments. Secondly,
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the ships constructed were not sufficiently productive to
operate profitably even with subsidy. They were constructed
in small lots, individualized to owners requirements, yet
with arbitrary speed criteria set by the Government. The
latter, determined primarily for national defense reasons,
increased ship and crew costs often with no commercial
benefit. More important however, the designs involved no
reduction in cargo handling and in port costs which after
subsidy were the operator's major out of pocket costs. The
failure to foster the development of containerization has
been the major technical deficiency in the replacement
program. It plus the failure to initiate a market development
program are the primary reasons why the operating differential
subsidy has preempted 2/3 of the direct subsidy appropriations,
and has limited construction subsidy funding since 1962.
Lacking explicit national defense and commercial
objectives the measures of success or failure of the direct
liner subsidy program became the degree to which cost parity
for the liners was or was not achieved. In such an atmosphere
the most that can be said of the construction program is that
it achieved some level greater than if there had been no
subsidy. Without explicit objectives it could develop neither
an efficient liner fleet nor an efficient shipbuilding industry
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The Government also supports unsubsidized liners and
non-liners through cargo preference statutes which basically
require that 50 per cent of government sponsored cargoes be
reserved for U. S. ships. These ships, which cannot compete
profitably with foreign ships, are employed at a preference
rate which is generally 1^ to 2 times the foreign shipping
rate. The cost of this program is not as visible as the
direct liner subsidies because it is administered by a number
of agencies with funds that are not specifically identified
in Federal appropriations as a subsidy. The costs can only
be estimated. The total preference differential for 1969,
excluding defense cargoes, approximated $114 million. This
is the largest merchant marine subsidy expenditure after the
operating subsidy and some 20 per cent greater than the
construction subsidy for 1969. The bankruptcy of preference
rates as far as a viable merchant marine is concerned is
that none of the features of the 1936 Act which commit liner
operators to ship replacement are included. The results
have been the maintenance of an overage fleet (approximately
90 per cent over 20 years old) which depends on preference
rates for 70 per cent of its cargo. This situation was
allowed to develop even though 1952 legislation permitted
construction subsidy of bulk carriers (most preference cargoes
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are bulk shipments) , and 30 bulk carriers, built with 50 per
cent subsidy, could replace the 106 most inefficient non-
liners and return the subsidy investment in 6 years operation
at reduced preference rates.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1970 proposes to correct
the above noted deficiencies. It sets both a cargo carriage
and a construction goal to be attained by 1980. Multiyear
construction of standard, high productive ships are emphasized.
Both dry and liquid bulk carriers are to be included in the
construction program and be eligible for operating differential
subsidy; both for the explicit purpose of modernizing that
segment of. the fleet and the eventual elimination of
preference rates.
The Shipbuilding Industry
The segment of the shipbuilding industry capable of
building ocean going ships for the merchant marine consists
of 17 shipyards, 12 of which are building or have built ships
for the merchant marine, and 11 of which have been involved
in subsidized construction. These major shipyards differ
widely in their financial condition, plant assets, capabilities,
stability of employment, and construction mix. The shipyards
like the Navy and merchant marine are primarily products of
World War II. Only one new shipyard has been built since
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that time, the Litton Ship Systems facility on the Gulf
Coast.
Ship construction is the primary activity of these
yards and since 1959 Navy construction has employed 61 to 73
per cent of their construction work force. Because of high
costs they have not competed for foreign construction since
their last foreign deliveries in 1960. Construction of U. S.
merchant ships for private owners without subsidy has been
highly variable and has consisted primarily of tankers for
the domestic fleet. The subsidized construction program has
been the major source of merchant construction for the
industry. Of 191 merchant ships delivered between 1961 and
1970, 146 were subsidized. Were it not for subsidized
construction, merchant ship awards between 1958 and 1966
would have averaged less than 4 per year.'
When viewed in detail however subsidized construction
has not been a very stable source of employment for the
industry, nor has it encouraged improved production techniques
and capital investment. The proliferation of individual ship
designs developed to meet owner desires has resulted in an
average of 5 ships per identical design and on the order of
3 ships per contract. Both well below the numbers necessary
to realize learning curve benefits and amortize the size of
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engineering costs and capital investments which are needed
to produce efficiently. Three shipyards have participated
heavily in the subsidy program to the extent that each
delivered 15 per cent or more of the subsidized deliveries,
and that work has represented better than 80 per cent of
their merchant construction. Even in this group there is
only one, that of all the shipyards, has received a commitment
to build 10 or more ships in a single contract.
That the subsidy program could have better developed
both a modern merchant marine and a more efficient shipbuilding
industry is evident. Just the decision to build more productive
containerships instead of increasing operating subsidies to
breakbulk liners, and to build those 30 bulk carriers would
have provided construction employment double that experienced
by the most well supported shipyard.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1970 is supposed to correct
these deficiencies. Its multiyear construction of standard
ships designed for efficient production is intended to
encourage the capital investment in new facilities at the
same time reducing the amount of construction subsidy required.
The program is already behind schedule on ship awards because
of lack of private funding and only one type ship is in series
production. A several year stretchout beyond 1980 can be
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anticipated. The shipyards however have demonstrated through
recent actions that given the opportunity for efficient
production they are ready to commit the necessary resources.
Inherent in the program is a reduction in the number
of participating shipyards. This tendency is paralleled by
a similar bias in the Navy's construction programs. The
result will probably be a reduction to 6-8 shipyards actively
engaged in naval and merchant marine construction in the
early 1980' s.
Overall the subsidy programs could have developed a
more productive merchant marine and shipbuilding industry for
no more than has been expended in the last 15 years. To do
this would have required the explicit statement of both
national defense and commercial objectives for the merchant
marine and the shipbuilding industry. The latter is most
important, for as much as anything else, it has been the
lack of a clear government commitment to a prosperous merchant
marine that has limited the availability of investment capital
Commercial objectives should have included the expansion of
U. S. flag markets and the development and construction of
standardized productive ships. Such a program could not
only have better modernized the merchant marine and eliminated
the totally government supported non-liner fleet, but it also
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could have encouraged the modernization of several of the
major private shipyards. The Merchant Marine Act of 1970
goes along way towards accomplishing the needed reforms, but
has not as yet attracted the private investment capital












Packaged cargo that must be stowed
aboard ship.
Construction-differential subsidy
Difference between the weight of a
vessel in the load and light
condition measured in long tons.
Cargoes that can be placed aboard
ship unpackaged such as grain,
minerals, and ores.
Total internal capacity of a ship
in units of 100 cubic feet.
Composed of vessels carrying break-
bulk cargo over fixed itineraries on
regular schedules.
Maritime Administration
Composed of tramp vessels and dry
bulk carriers operating without
fixed itinerary or schedules.








Ship operator whose ships are con-
structed with government CDS
assistance and receives ODS to
compensate for the differential
between U. S. and foreign operating
costs
.
Non-liner shipping generally designed
for breakbulk cargoes which are
utilized in breakbulk and dry bulk
trades.
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